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 Ever since the first atomic bomb was dropped over Japan to end World War II, there have 
been many questions that arise from the use of nuclear bombs.  There are two basic arguments 
for the employment of nuclear weapons.  One is the deterrence policy.  This ensures that a state 
will not be attacked by its hostile neighbors.  The second is a policy of brinkmanship.  This is the 
policy of using one’s nuclear arsenal to coerce others to give into one’s demands.  Both of these 
policies will be explored in this paper.  
 The main point of this paper is to explore the relations between Israel and the Arab 
neighbors who were involved in the Arab-Israeli wars.  Specifically, the paper will look at when 
Israel proliferated in order to gain a better understanding if that event played any factor in 
producing peace/cold peace between Israel and these Arab countries.  The paper will end by 
examining the problem of Iran, and offering policy suggestions on how Israel can use its nuclear 
program to bring peace to the Levant.  
 The paper will begin with an overview of the literature about the arguments for and 
against nuclear proliferation.  Those arguments will be framed in the context regarding the 
countries of the Levant.  The paper will examine the policies for deterrence and brinkmanship to 
gain a better understanding of if Israel’s nuclear program brought peace to the Levant.   The 
paper will then produce five hypotheses to test what brought about peace between Israel and her 
neighbors.  It is hoped that the results of these tests will lie to rest the question if Israel’s nuclear 
program was a significant factor in bringing about the relative peace between Israel and her Arab 
neighbors.  The paper will end by examining the current problem of Iran.  Finally, the paper will 
address shortcomings in the tests (if any) to give policy recommendations on how nuclear peace 
can be achieved in the Levant.   
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I. Introduction 
Since 1973, there has been no major war between the armies of Israel and its Arab 
neighbors.  Has the threat of nuclear war brought this peace?  Nuclear proliferation has been a 
subject of intense debate since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Japan sixty-four years ago.  
The primary question is this, have nuclear weapons brought peace to the Levant or is some other 
factor responsible?  It is understood that this is a hard question to answer, since this is a non 
event.  They are harder to explain than actual events.  This paper hopes to shed light on what did 
occur in the light of the question asked.  The argument brought forth by those who advocate 
proliferation is that it brings security to the state that develops nuclear weapons.  The goal of this 
paper is to determine if Israel’s nuclear program has brought a cold peace (i.e. like the nuclear 
peace between the United States and the Soviet Union) to the Levant.   
Israel’s nuclear program was developed to ensure Israel’s existence as a state (Karpin, 
29).  From its inception as a state, Israel has been attacked by its neighbors.  Since that early War 
for Independence until 1973 War, the armies of Israel have continued to fight the armies of their 
Arab neighbors through multiple wars.  However, in 1973 this stopped.  Also, soon after the 
1973 War, Israel annexed the occupied territories.  This is when the traditional wars ceased.  
Although there have been small scale conflicts (i.e. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon twice, Iraq’s 
scud missile attack during the first Persian Gulf War, and the rocket attacks from Hamas), there 
has not been another war between the armies of Israel and its Arab neighbors.  It can be 
hypothesized that the reason for the relative peace is that Israel’s nuclear capabilities came fully 
on-line, meaning they could now produce nuclear weapons.  Israel’s proliferation brings in the 
argument about deterrence.  This argument holds that possessing nuclear weapons ensures that 
one will not be attacked by another state.  Even though Israel does not openly admit that their 
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nuclear program exists, they dropped hints that they have nuclear capabilities (Quester, 554).  
This paper will lay out the evidence and then see if there is any validity to the hypothesis that 
Israel’s nuclear weapons program is responsible for this peace.  This will accomplished by 
examining case studies that look into the old anti Israeli Arab alliance of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Syria.    This paper will also determine if there is any other plausible explanation 
to why there has been an era of peace in this region (i.e. economics, the presence of the United 
States, etc.).  The paper will end by explaining how Israel can use its nuclear arsenal to counter 
the Iranian threat and truly bring peace to the Levant.     
II. Literature Review 
 The purpose of this section is to examine nuclear proliferation theories.  This section will 
examine why states and some experts argue that nuclear arms lead to peace and security.  This is 
the concept of proliferation which leads to nuclear deterrence.  Finally, I will discuss the dangers 
of states possessing nuclear weapons (in Israel’s case why nuclear weapons may not bring 
peace).  This information will help in the assessment of whether Israel’s nuclear weapons have 
brought peace to the region.  This assessment will be compared with other hypotheses on why 
there has not been a major conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors.  The paper will 
specifically look at the question of does nuclear deterrence work and does it bring peace. 
 Nuclear Proliferation:  The Good 
There is a classic argument about proliferation bringing peace that goes back to the Cold 
War.  That theory is that the threat of mutual destruction brings peace.  Basically one nuclear 
state will not attack another nuclear state for fear of nuclear retaliation, or a non-nuclear state 
will not attack a nuclear state because the risks are too high (Perkovitch, 14).  Was this the case 
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of why Israel proliferated?  The latter is what the paper focuses on if one state having nuclear 
arms has deterred attack from its non nuclear neighbors.  
The face of warfare forever changed in August of 1945, when two atomic bombs 
eliminated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  The arms race began when the 
Soviets detonated their own atomic bomb.  Others followed suit because they did not want to be 
bullied by others, and they wanted to be the ones in power (Berkowitz, 116).  Israel proliferated, 
for the same reason as other states did, to ensure its survival as a state from the other hostile 
states in the region (Quester, 547).  As a future section will show, some of those states were 
trying to proliferate to accomplish their goal of destroying the Israeli state.   The ultimate defense 
in Israel’s nuclear plan is an option that is supposed to be the ultimate plan for nuclear 
deterrence.  Bell in 1972, argues that this is especially crucial given the fact that Israel sees itself 
as a small David compared to the gang of Arab Goliaths around them (Bell, 383).  Small Israel 
needed something to minimize the size difference.  This is especially true given the rise of the 
Arab-Russo alliance.  Israel responded to this new threat by implementing a Masada type plan 
(Masada was the stronghold where the Jews killed themselves instead of surrendering to the 
Romans).  This is called the Samson Option (Bell, 386).  This is named for the Biblical hero of 
Samson he took his own life to destroy his enemies.  Israel combined these two strategies with 
their nuclear arms.  What this means is that if Israel faces imminent doom, then they will unleash 
all of their nuclear weapons to wipe out their enemies (Bell, 387).  This is the instance where one 
could argue that Israel will use its nuclear arsenal in an offensive manner.  This is the ultimate 
form of deterrence.  Once the Arab states know Israel will use this option, it is hoped they will 
stop pushing for Israel’s destruction via military might. 
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 In order to understand nuclear deterrence as a peace policy, one must understand the 
stages and reasons for why a state undertakes nuclear proliferation.  This helps understand why a 
state thinks nuclear proliferation is beneficial.  It also gives proof that state has or will soon 
proliferate.  How does a state proliferate?  There are three stages that a state goes through in 
order to proliferate.  The first stage is technological determinants, the second stage is external 
determinants, and finally the third stage on why a state proliferates is internal determinants.  This 
includes building nuclear plants as having a good impact on the country’s economy i.e. creates 
jobs and power (Singh et al, 861).  Israel set up a research institute to help them develop nuclear 
capabilities (Karpin, 37). Israel needed expert help and the uranium to make the nuclear fuel 
rods.  The French agreed to help the Israelis set up a reactor and help them develop their nuclear 
program (Karpin, 81).  Part of this agreement had to do with getting Israel to be apart of the force 
that would help the French and the British retake the Suez Canal from the Egyptians (Karpin, 
75).  Once a country possesses the technology and material to build a nuclear weapon it is 
usually only a matter of time before they proliferate (Singh et al. 862).  It needs to be understood 
that having this conditional alone does not mean a state will proliferate.  Once all of these factors 
are present a state in a situation like Israel is bound to see that proliferation could lead to more 
effective defense and a reason to deter future aggression by its hostile neighbors.    
If the first condition is present, then it helps build up on the other two.  Another reason a 
state proliferates is if it perceives itself to be under threat from a foreign power (Singh et al, 863).  
This could be argued to be the case with Israel.  Finally, a state can proliferate for internal 
reasons as well.  Nuclear power is an excellent source of alternative energy.  Additionally, it 
helps to create jobs (Singh et al, 864-865).  Israel did use the reactor to generate electricity which 
helped Israel grow in spite of it having no oil (Karpin, 141).  This has provided good cover for 
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Israel’s nuclear weapons program.  All of these factors give considerable proof that Israel has 
nuclear capabilities.  This helps alleviate the uncertainty other states have in wondering if Israel 
is a nuclear power.  
There are also other reasons why a state would choose to proliferate.  Montgomery gives 
a graph on four variables and how they affect proliferation.  Those four variables are:  global 
controls, regime change, incentives, and isolation (Montgomery, 155).  As states undertake 
regime changes that are in the centralized regime category, they are likely to pursue nuclear 
weapons.  The example of Iran and North Korea is given (Montgomery, 155).  Montgomery 
argues that it is not enough to claim to have the material for making nuclear facilities; one must 
prove that they have it.  This is essential to Schelling’s argument that in order for nuclear 
deterrence to work, there must not be any doubt that a state has and will use its nuclear arsenal 
(Schelling, 152).  This will be used to address the problems that are associated with Israel 
proliferating and the War of 1973.  This information will beneficial in examining the future cases 
to test if Israel’s nuclear weapons deterred attack from their Arab neighbors.   
In addition, to be truly effective, the states must develop delivery systems to get the 
nuclear payloads to their targets.  These usually take the form of missiles, though some can be 
dropped from conventional bombers.  A state must develop a missile that is strong enough to 
carry a payload to its distant target.  This can be used to bolster Schelling’s argument of 
commitment.  The problem is developing a reliable missile delivery system (Montgomery, 161).  
Israel has developed a reliable missile delivery system via their Jericho rocket system.    At this 
beginning stage, the weapons produced at the Dimona facility would not be equipped to be fitted 
on missiles.  This was to underscore the fact that these weapons would be used for defensive 
purposes only (Karpin, 127).  The combination of missiles and nuclear material makes it very 
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possible to send a deterrence threat to hostile neighbors.  Israel can effectively threaten to use 
missiles to take out any state that wants to destroy it.   
Some writers argue that once a state proliferates, it brings the likelihood of peace.  This 
can be accomplished either through the policy of mutually assured destruction, or that your state 
will be annihilated if you do not accede to the wishes of the nuclear state (Berkowitz, 118).  
Berkowitz makes the interesting argument that nuclear weapons can be used to make peace.  He 
argues that if a state has nuclear weapons and its hostile neighbors do not (like Israel and its Arab 
neighbors), then the nuclear state can make sure it is not attacked by its hostile neighbors 
(Berkowitz, 129).  Statistical analysis by Bueno de Mesquita finds this hypothesis to be correct 
(de Mesquita, 288).  However, this becomes problematic if its hostile neighbors also proliferate.  
This can end in either of two options.  One result is “cold war”, such as the one between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and the other result is an attack that will wipe out all of the 
states involved (Berkowitz, 123).   
This scenario relates to the theory of realism, which holds that power is the most 
important determinant in international relations.  Power in this case is achieved via the use of 
nuclear arms (Weber, 60).  This prevents a state from being attacked, so it provides security.  It 
also means that they can use these weapons to pursue their own goals (Weber, 60).  Realists also 
argue that by having a balance of power one can achieve peace (de Mesquita, 288).  This means 
that no one state is powerful enough to successfully defeat its neighbors.  The cost greatly 
outweighs the benefit (Weber, 61).  This can be applied to the theory of nuclear peace in the 
Levant.  Right now with only Israel having nuclear weapons there is an imbalance of power.  
This can lead to conflict, as the weaker states try to band together to change this status quo.  If 
both sides have nuclear weapons then there is a balance of power.  Once there is a balance then 
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no war will break out because the costs overcome the benefits.  This also allows room for 
negotiation, because going to war could mean nuclear annihilation (Weber, 69).  This is all 
drawn upon the experiences of what happened between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and the hope that this concept can be applied across the globe. 
Bipolarity is key to having nuclear deterrence work; it will not work as well in a unipolar 
environment.  The reason for this is due to the concept of mutually assured destruction.  The 
theory does not bring peace if it is in the hands of one state.  If this happens then there is no 
check on the ambitions of a state.  They can demand and get whatever they want.  Also the other 
state can decide that this has gone on long enough, and it would be better to fight than make any 
more concessions.  Then one gets the opposite of peace with conflict (Rauchhaus, 259).  
Rauchhaus’ models support the hypothesis that Mr. Mesquita suggested (Mesquita, 288).   If two 
rival states possess nuclear weapons, then the likelihood for conflict decreases.  If one state does 
not have nuclear capabilities and the others do, then the likelihood of conflict increases.  The 
potential for conflict is at its peak when neither rival state has nuclear weapons.  This removes a 
considerable deterrent to going to war (Rauchhaus, 263-264).  If one finds independent models 
that back up the conclusion of the other ones, then it lends more credibility to those models.  This 
has shown to be the case.  So if the evidence seems to point at Israel being the only nuclear state 
in the Levant, could this argument be applied?  One of the future hypotheses will examine if two 
nuclear states have brought peace to the Levant.         
It was assumed that states would follow the models laid out by the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  They would follow the rules of acting rationally with the cache of nuclear arms.  
Walker argues that if one follows the norms established by the nuclear policies of the United 
States and the Soviet Union, then one can use nuclear arms to achieve peace (Walker, 715).  
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Israel basically followed those norms.  They have not used their nuclear arsenal to coerce their 
enemies to meeting Israel’s demands.  They would rather negotiate then use their missiles to 
achieve their goals.  They seem to only use their nuclear arms to make sure that their country is 
not overrun by Arab armies (Bell, 384). 
The consensus of these experts is that proliferating brings about international security.  
When a state is surrounded by hostile neighbors, as is the case with Israel, then it would be more 
likely to proliferate (if it has the capabilities) in order to achieve security (Dong-Joon Jo, 10).  It 
is useless to achieve domestic security.  One cannot use the weapons on one’s own country 
because it would destroy everything, thus being counterproductive (Dong-Joon Jo, 2).  Having 
nuclear weapons brings about a change in status.  With this new power status comes the privilege 
of security.  It brings security to itself by being a regional or world power (Dong-Joon Jo, 5).  
Israel sees itself surrounded by enemies.  They have fought wars with their neighbors, who they 
see as trying to push them into the sea. Israel proliferated to make sure that this would never 
happen to them (Levite, 64).  Israel’s nuclear weapons program is known as nuclear hedging.  
This means that they developed their system relatively fast and that they have the means to 
deliver their nuclear payload.  Usually these weapons programs are kept secret in order to 
enhance their credibility (Levite, 69).  Israel set up its reactor at Dimona, in the desert.  This was 
set up in order for Israel to keep its program a secret.  They knew that if the United States found 
out about their program too early than they would shut it down.  So this location kept the reactor 
a secret until they had processed too much uranium, and it had been active for so long, it would 
be impossible for the United States to shut them down (Karpin, 119).This describes Israel’s 
weapons program.  They developed it for security, and a side effect is that deterrence could have 
brought a cold peace between Israel and its neighbors. 
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There is also the policy of using nuclear brinkmanship as a way to use their nuclear 
weapons program for peace.  It is argued that if a nuclear state practices brinkmanship than it 
would coerce its opponent into submitting to the will of the nuclear state (Powell, 104).  This 
basically means that a state threatens to use its nuclear arms to get what it wants in a dispute.  
This is different from deterrence.  Where deterrence focuses on state security, brinkmanship uses 
the threat of war to gain concessions.  The other state will withdraw if they feel that the threat is 
credible.  They would not want to face a nuclear attack from a state obviously willing to use that 
option to get what they want.  This is a policy of self preservation (Powell, 105).  This coincides 
with Israel’s nuclear policy (Joffe, 38).  Having nuclear weapons emboldens states to use the 
weapons to get what they want.  This is because the consequences for the opposing state refusing 
go up considerably.  This could also help ward off invasions or bullying from rivals.  They will 
back down because they see that the other state has the deadly weapons and are not afraid to use 
them to protect themselves and further their own interests (Powell, 107).   
There is discussion on how nuclear proliferation helps states gain concessions.  It is 
theorized that possessing nuclear weapons, when your neighbor does not, means that you will get 
faster concessions and more from them (Beardsley et al, 282).  This means that other states 
would be more forthcoming on meeting one’s demands because they would not want to be the 
subject of a nuclear attack.  To test this hypothesis, the authors conducted a statistical analysis.  
The analysis found out quantitatively that one state having a nuclear bomb when the its rival 
does not, means that the state has more leeway to get what it requests (Beardsley et al, 289).  
This is the situation in Israel right now.  Because of the various treaties, no states after those who 
proliferated in 1967 can proliferate now.  Israel proliferated in 1967, but its Arab neighbors have 
not.  Meaning that Israel holds the cards of using nuclear weapons to get what they want from 
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their neighbors (Walker, 721).  However, Israel has not used its program to coerce its enemies 
into granting concessions.  As of this writing Israel has not pursued this policy, so the point of 
Israel being a danger is moot.  This will help establish the reasons why Israel should not be 
harassed when it openly admits its nuclear program.  That will help with a later section that looks 
at how Israel can use its nuclear program to bring peace to the Levant.    
  States also help their allies proliferate.  This is done in order to help the ally be able to 
defend itself without aid from the aiding country.  This helps cut back on that country’s military 
aid (Feaver et al, 218).  This could also be done to help offset the burdens of the first state.  By 
creating a new power in the region, it brings a new ally that can help bear some of the load to 
stabilize the region.  Both of those reasons have been cited to explain why the United States has 
turned a blind eye, encouraged, or help build the nuclear arsenal of the Israeli state.  This also 
allows for control.  The first state can make sure that the second state only advances as far 
enough to serve the interests of their state in the region (Feaver et al, 220).  As their program 
advanced, Israel was able to get material from the United States.  This was helped by the fact that 
they claimed their program was for peaceful purposes.  The United States saw it as an 
opportunity to help an ally and to stabilize the region.  The United States hoped that even though 
the program was a peaceful one (at least in their eyes) that the prospect of Israel having the bomb 
would deter aggression from Israel’s Arab neighbors (Karpin, 141).  This helped because even 
after France withdrew from the project, the United States continued support (Karpin, 183).  Thus 
Israel had all the outside help needed to keep their program on-line.  Israel’s program came fully 
on-line, it is hypothesized, in the year 1967 (Karpin, 271).  Israel joined the nuclear club and 
became the only state in the region to acquire and maintain its nuclear capability and weapons. 
This has shown how nuclear states can help others proliferate.  They do it to make a state 
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stronger.  The state then uses its power as a deterrent to keep peace in its region, which is what 
the allies want.  Israel could use its nuclear power to help achieve the United States’ goal of 
peace in the Levant.   
The concern now was what Israel was going to do with its new program.  Would they 
continue to keep it a secret?  Would they use it for aggression?  Israel quickly maintained that 
their arsenal was for defensive purposes only.  They would only use it when their existence as a 
state was at risk (Dowty, 87).  This meant that their program was just for security purposes.  This 
has been proven since Israel has not made any demands by threatening to use its nuclear arsenal 
to get what it wants.  They have also not used it in the conflicts they have had with their 
neighbors since the 1967 war when they proliferated (Dowty, 92).  The presence of Israel’s 
nuclear weapons program has also brought prestige and equality.  Now Israel can use the 
program as a bargaining chip to have their voices heard at the negotiating table.  No longer will 
they be kept in the dark about secret agreements that pertain to them (Dowty, 96).  The Israelis 
have also never disclosed that they possess the bomb.  They believe that it is more effective if the 
governments of their rivals and the world are left wondering if they do or not (Dowty, 97).  This 
measure of uncertainty means that they will not be criticized for their program, plus feeling that 
they might have it is a good deterrent.  Israel has only relied on strength to preserve its statehood 
from outside threats.  The reason why they were not annihilated in the 1948 war was because of 
their superior military (Shalit, 416).  However, as the Arabs turned to the Soviet Union for 
military aid, Israel found that the Arabs were fast becoming their equals in military might.  The 
best way for them to stay on top would be for them to develop a nuclear arms program, and then 
make sure that their enemies did not acquire it also.  They have achieved this goal (Shalit, 421).  
The work by Shalit tells of how Israel has never been the aggressor in their eyes.  They were 
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invaded by their neighbors, or they were about to be invaded so they needed to attack.  
Therefore, Israel is not an aggressive power but rather a defensive one.  This helps give 
legitimacy to their claim that their nuclear weapons program is safe.  Plus it provides an example 
of why the international community should not take this program away from them (Shalit, 419-
422).  This is crucial for the policy implication section.  International acceptance of their 
program is crucial for them to bring nuclear peace to the Levant. 
Israel has gone through great trouble to keep its program a secret.  When Dimona first 
came on-line the government claimed that it was a textile plant (Quester, 548).  Whenever the 
rumors that Israel has a nuclear program and weapons, then the government will come out and 
try to conceal it by officially denying the existence of said program (Quester, 552).  The question 
is how this program can be effective if it is secret.  This goes against the arguments of deterrence 
and brinkmanship discussed earlier in this section.  The government will sometimes encourage 
leaks about the program when it is viewed that the leak will help them in their relations with their 
neighbors.  This way they can gauge their reactions and make the appropriate policy changes or 
initiatives (Quester, 552).  Israel also uses this denial as a way for them to be unhindered in the 
nuclear program.  By not saying that they have weapons they do not have to abide, or be 
pressured, to abide by the numerous treaties limiting testing, numbers, and use of their weapons.  
The free hand gives them leverage to keep war out of the region.  This means that they can do 
what they want with their program, this lack of restraint puts fear into their neighbors to make 
them reconsider any attack on Israel in order to destroy her existence as a state (Quester, 554).  
The program has ended all out war between Israel and her neighbors, according to Maoz.  It has 
forced her enemies to consider other strategies.  It has helped build up Israel’s military might, 
and it has helped at the negotiating table (Maoz, 44).  However, small conflicts continue.  Hamas 
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and Hezbollah, supported by Syria, still carry out attacks against Israel (Maoz, 66).  So while 
out-right warfare has diminished, these small terrorist attacks have remained and increased.  
Maoz even points out that these attacks are worse because they attack civilians and it is hard to 
strike back and destroy these organizations (Maoz, 67).  There is also a mixed response in Israel 
to its weapons program.  The populace does not like the secrecy that comes with the program.  
They want their government to be open with them.  They also feel that this program is a way for 
their country to be criticized and discredited in international venues (Maoz, 73).  Maoz argues 
for these reasons that Israel’s nuclear program has not brought peace.  This paper hopes to 
examine the impact of Israel’s nuclear program on these acts of asymmetric warfare. 
Nuclear Proliferation:  The Bad 
There are arguments presented that claim that having nuclear weapons does not bring 
peace.  They instead increase the chance of conflict.  So instead of security, there is fear of 
nuclear war.  Instead of peace there is potential for a catastrophic conflict to break out in the 
region.  If this is true, then having nuclear weapons does not bring peace.  This section will 
examine why experts see nuclear arms as such a big threat.  There is concern that the states will 
follow brinkmanship patterns, and that terrorists will gain possession of nuclear warheads.  They 
argue both of these scenarios are grave concerns for peace in the Levant. 
All of the states in this region possessing nuclear arms can have grave consequences.  
Shikaki talks about this scenario.  He points out that there have been numerous wars in this 
region over Israel’s claim to land.  As a result there is a strong a deep rivalry amongst these 
countries.  If the Arabs get nuclear weapons, then there is a strong temptation to use it to achieve 
their goal of wiping Israel off of the map (Rosen, 1368).  As pointed out above, these countries 
are run by the military and it is easy for them to use the nuclear weapons.  Sagan points out the 
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fundamental weaknesses of nuclear proliferation.  The ones responsible for proliferation usually 
are the military.  Military norms lead to deterrence failures.  The military will want to use 
nuclear arms to minimize their troop and material losses.  There is also the public sector being 
responsible for nuclear deterrence on failing.  In a majority of states where there is nuclear 
proliferation there is no strong civilian control to counteract the practices of the military.  Plus 
there are some in the public sphere who echo the military’s sentiments on using nuclear weapons 
for a fast and painless war (Sagan, 68).  Sagan again points to how deterrence was crafted on a 
western world view.  Other states may not hold the same values that westerners do.  This could 
lead them to not use nuclear arms as an act of deterrence, but rather for an act of aggression 
(Sagan, 70).  Sagan argues that nuclear arms have not achieved peace, but rather that diplomacy 
has.  Using diplomacy and economic venues one can talk with another state to give incentives to 
adopt peaceful policies.  This would be classified as a liberal approach to diffusing conflicts 
(Sagan, 76).  There is also the possibility that having nuclear arms will lead to conflict.  Sagan 
points to the suggestion that North Korea having nuclear weapons will lead them to use that to 
annex South Korea (Sagan, 99).  These countries could use it to get rid of Israel and take back 
their land that Israel took from them during their past conflicts (Shikaki, 156).  
There are also problems with using nuclear brinkmanship to achieve peace.  Nuclear 
brinkmanship can lead to an arms race.  If one state escalates, than so does the other state in 
order to achieve security.  This is called an arms race, and is the result of the security dilemma 
(Powell, 97).  The security dilemma is where a state begins to arms itself in order to be ready for 
future action.  The neighbors get scared that they will be invaded, so they begin to arm.  This 
leads to a spiral of events that leads to an arms race.    This leads to living in fear that the other 
state will launch a nuclear attack against the other state.  Arms races usually end up in one of two 
 18 
ways: one is that the crisis is diffused, and the second is that it breaks out into conflict (Powell, 
98).  When one has uncertainty about when a state begins brinkmanship then the probability for 
events to spiral out of control greatly increases.  Events spiraling out of control in this nuclear 
environment could lead to a nuclear attack (Powell, 99).  This is especially true in regard to 
rogue states.  They are more susceptible to engage in brinkmanship strategies.  Some experts 
have stated that Israel is such a state that could pursue this policy (Harkavy, 136).  This would 
not lead to peace in the region via nuclear arms.  This is a zero sum strategy; we use our nuclear 
capabilities to get what we want, and if we don’t get what we want then everyone loses (Powell, 
101). 
 Once the Soviet Union collapsed, the many nuclear scientists of that state were without a 
job.  The nuclear facilities and weapons were scattered in the successor states that emerged from 
the old Soviet Union.  Many of these weapons simply disappeared (Braun et al, 7).  There was 
speculation that these jobless scientists sold their knowledge to the highest bidder, and some of 
the nuclear arms were sold in order to make a profit or that they were stolen (Braun et al, 6).  
There is also evidence that these regimes are helping one another proliferate.  North Korea has 
been selling nuclear material to help Pakistan proliferate (Braun et al, 12).  Given the rhetoric of 
these countries it would appear that they do not intend to use them for defensive purposes, but 
that they may be used for offensive purposes (Braun et al, 21).  It is feared the Arabs will pursue 
this model if they secure nuclear arms.  They will then be able to coerce Israel to meet their 
demands (Harkavy, 143).  This is especially applicable to Iran.  If Iran gets the nuclear weapons 
then there may no loner be a state of Israel.  This will be addressed in a future section.   
 One of the worst fears about nuclear arms is that they will fall into the hands of terrorists.  
These are groups who use violence to draw attention to their plight and affect policy change 
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(Krieger, 45).  As of now, terrorists have only been able to use conventional weapons to carry 
out their attacks.  This could change with the development of the Pakistan and Arab scenarios 
listed above.  Once a terrorist organization possesses a nuclear device they could get whatever 
they wanted (Krieger, 46).  If Al-Qaeda gains nuclear arms then the western countries are 
endangered.  The same is true if Hamas had nuclear weapons, then there would no longer be a 
state of Israel.  The difficulty is that once these groups get these weapons traditional forms of 
deterrence will not work.  Terrorists do not have a country of origin for a punishment attack to be 
launched.  There are many cells around the region or the world.  This makes eliminating them in 
an attack very unlikely, and means that these groups would be able to use their nuclear arms to 
retaliate (Krieger, 46).  This is why there is concern about scientists selling their nuclear 
knowledge and nuclear material going missing.  The fear is that this technology will end up in 
the hands of the terrorists.  The end result is not a happy ending for the Western/civilized 
governments of the world (Krieger, 50).  If terrorists gained nuclear arms then they would not 
follow the western models of deterrence.  All bets would be off of using nuclear deterrence to 
bring peace to the Levant (Harkavy, 136).  This section will play a critical role in explaining the 
dangers a terrorist group allied with Iran has for Israel.                                     
III. Theory 
 A factor contributing to Israel’s proliferation is the state’s mistrust of the governments of 
the world.  They remember that the same countries who act as friends now were responsible for 
genocidal practices against them in the past.  This is especially true of the Holocaust and Stalin’s 
programs in the former Soviet Union (Joffe, 36).  Thus Israel feels that they can not trust these 
governments when it comes to security.  Israel sees these governments as pressuring them to 
bend to the wills of their enemies (Quester, 557).  These governments have asked Israel to give 
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up some territory to their enemies which Israel believes was rightly won.  They see these 
governments as biased against their interests (Joffe, 41).  Believing that they cannot rely on these 
governments for support or protection from their enemies, Israel had to find another way.  That 
option was acquiring nuclear weapons.  This would be the ultimate deterrent, because it would 
let its neighbors know that they are here to stay as a state.  Plus it sends out the message that if 
we are destroyed then so will our enemies (Joffe, 38).  Now that it is understood why and how a 
state proliferates, it is necessary to examine the results of proliferation. 
The argument made by the authors in the literature review is whether or not nuclear 
weapons deter states from attacking other states.  From the data presented, there is strong 
evidence that supports nuclear arms act as an effective deterrent.  Nuclear arms are the 
independent variable.  The next step is to see if this variable brings about the dependent variable 
of peace in the Levant.  They argue that deterrence brings about peace.  This is the result of 
increasing the cost of attacking a nuclear state.  The cost benefit analysis goes against an armed 
attack and support a stand off, or a cold peace.  The prime example is what happened between 
the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war.  It is hoped that nuclear deterrence 
can be applied to the Levant as well.  This policy could be the reason to explain why the armies 








Table 1:  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Test Result 
1.  Arabs can not beat Israel Number of casualties, time 
between conflict, expenditures 
outweigh the revenue of the 
hostile countries. 
Arabs realize they can no beat 
Israel, so peace is attained. 
2.  Internal dynamics Presence of a foreign 
occupier, number of coups, 
attempted coups, and who is in 
charge will be measured to 
test a country’s stability.   
If a country is deemed 
unstable, then they are unable 
to be a threat to a neighbor. 
3.  International Pressures Measure the amount of foreign 
economic and military aid, 
and the conditions for said aid.  
Also looking at that state’s 
international policy. 
States adopt foreign policy 
acceptable to their 
beneficiaries.  States are busy 
with more pressing 
international matters.  
Thereby, cold peace is the 
result. 
4.  Danger of hostile states  
     proliferating 
Are other states proliferating, 
and why. 
Response to Israel having 
nuclear arms, then nuclear 
arms are destabilizing the 
region. 
5.  Nuclear Deterrence Israel proliferates; Arabs 
realize that Israel will use the 
nukes in another war. 
Conflict decreases after Israel 
proliferates. 
 
 The best way to test would be examining case studies.  This is crucial because case 
studies allow one to see the internal conditions of each country involved.  This leads to more 
detail on the interactions between these states and Israel.  The interactions between Israel, Egypt, 
Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran will be examined.  The theory will be tested if those 
countries decided to stop invading Israel due to Israel’s nuclear weapons.  The big limitation is 
the 1973 War happened after Israel proliferated, so the theory needs to be tested to find out why 
that was the case.  
There is a checklist that will be followed to test these five different hypotheses in the case 
studies.  As the countries are examined, the rhetoric of the leaders of the Arab states will be 
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examined to see if their intent was to annihilate the state of Israel or something else.  Basically 
what made them act the way they did towards Israel?  Also examined is when Israel annexed the 
occupied territories from the 1967 conquest.  This will be important to discover if nuclear 
deterrence worked.  If so, then the expected results would be less violent rhetoric about 
destroying Israel after the 1967 War, that the leaders would not invade Israel proper due to 
nuclear retaliation, and finally as a result they ordered their armies to stay out of Israel’s 
internationally recognized borders.  It is expected that the rhetoric coming out of those national 
leaders will be less inflammatory, meaning no more stating we will throw Israel into the sea.  
Also expected are communiqués from the Arab leaders to their armies not to invade Israel proper 
in subsequent military actions for fear of nuclear retaliation. 
 To test the first alternative hypothesis, in which the Arabs realized they could not beat 
Israel, it is important to see what factors caused this change of thinking.  This will be tested by 
looking at the progress of each Arab campaign against Israel.  Did they make gains during each 
war?  What were the attitudes of the military after the conflict?  If they made progress during 
each war and the leaders thought they could beat Israel in the next war, then this hypothesis does 
not hold true.   
The second hypothesis, stability of the regimes, will be tested by looking at the frequency 
of regime turnovers.  The indicators used to tell if a country is stable are the number of coups and 
attempted coups, and the presence of internal conflict.  These indicate if the governments of 
these countries function strong enough to be a threat to Israel.  Also important to examine is the 
role of foreign troops in a country, indication a country is under the occupation of another.  If 
there is a large quantity of these events, then this could prove that this theory is correct. 
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In order to test if the third alternative hypothesis is true about foreign intervention 
(especially on the part of the United States), the meetings between the heads of governments will 
be examined along with official documents that signaled agreements.  If these documents spell 
out conditions to aid those countries engaged in the conflict and those countries follow those 
conditions, then it is accepted that foreign intervention is the answer to state behavior.  Great 
Britain will be examined in the context of the 1848 War for Israeli Independence, and the United 
States will play a role after the 1948 War.  If this hypothesis is correct, there might be a direct 
link between foreign aid (military and other economic aid packages) and peace treaties signed 
with Israel.  If this hypothesis is true, then as these outside powers create more influence in these 
Arab countries then there is a decrease in conflict.  If there is a correlation between these foreign 
powers outlook in regard to Israel (hate -> hate, friendly -> friendly). 
  The fourth hypothesis deals with Bueno de Mesquita’s argument that a bipolar nuclear 
system will bring peace.  Examined will be if any of the case studies tried to proliferate.  If they 
did, what was the result?  The results will help determine if a bipolar nuclear sphere in the 
Levant has brought peace to the region.  If a state has proliferated, examined will be if conflict 
has decreased between that state and Israel.  If it has then it could explain the current cold peace 
in the Levant.  Also examined will be reaction Israel’s reaction to its neighbors proliferating.  If 
they react violently to stop that country from proliferating, then the bipolar nuclear state system 
in the Levant will not bring peace to that region.  . 
 The fifth hypothesis will look at the year 1967 when Israel proliferated.  If this hypothesis 
worked then it is expected that there was no wars between Israel and her neighbors after this 
year.  If there was conflict, did Israel’s nuclear program bring about a change of goals of the 
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invading states?  If the answer to these questions is yes, then it can be assumed that this 
hypothesis is at least partially true in explaining the cold peace in the Levant.   
IV. Case Studies 
The next portion of the analysis will cover the case studies.  The paper will look at the 
countries of Egypt and Jordan and their peace treaties with Israel.  The question examined is:  
has Israel’s nuclear arms brought about this peace, or was it the pressure from the United States, 
or were any of the other hypotheses in play?  Also in this category will be the study of Iraq.  
These are the countries that have a huge United States presence and who receive large amounts 
of aid from the United States (especially Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein).  Looking at the 
aid and presence of the United States in these countries will help test what theory describes the 
peace between Israel and these Arab states.  The psychologies and internal stability of these 
regimes will also be taken into consideration.  These countries were selected because they were 
the members of the Arab alliance that always seemed to have conflict with Israel.  Iran was 
included because of the current tension between the two countries over Iran’s nuclear program.   
 The next section will deal with Lebanon.  Again the paper will look at why the armies of 
Lebanon and Israel have not clashed.  This excludes the skirmishes with the Palestinians and 
Hezbollah who are treated as irregular forces.  The literature examined will shed light on the 
question of if the peace is the result of massive internal turmoil, the presence of Israeli troops in 
the region, nuclear deterrence, and the role of outside governments.  Syria will also be examined 
in this section.  Syria is the only one out of the old alliance of countries that have fought Israel to 
the 1973 War that is still hesitant about recognizing the state of Israel.  In spite of its rhetoric, 
Syria has still not engaged in conflict with Israel since 1973.  Again deterrence will be taken into 
account to see if that is the reason. 
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 The final examination of the case studies will be of the nation of Iran.  Recently Iran has 
embarked on a nuclear campaign and has espoused bellicose rhetoric against the Jewish state.  
This is the best example of how to fix the problems of deterrence addressed in the other sections.  
It is hoped that this section will show how Israel can use its nuclear program to deter any Iranian 
aggression.  The role of the United States and other foreign governments will be taken into 
account to see what policies they want to achieve peace in the region.  The paper will conclude 
by looking at these suggestions and finding which policy will bring peace to the Levant. 
Case Study #1 Iraq 
 Iraq is one of the countries that falls under this study.  They were involved in every major 
war with Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973).  What is interesting is that if one looks at the history of 
Iraq, one finds all of the hypotheses are present.  The question arises, what is the primary reason 
for Iraq’s cold peace with Israel.  This case study will look at the five hypotheses proposed to see 
which one best fits the case of Iraq.  The first hypothesis to be tested is that Iraq realized after so 
many wars that they were unable to beat Israel militarily, and so they settled for the cold peace. 
Hypothesis # 1 
Iraq was involved in conflicts with Israel up to the First Gulf War.  It is important to 
examine each of these conflicts to determine why they started.  To see if the hypothesis is viable, 
examining the duration, the outcome, and the aftermath of these conflicts will help determine if 
this hypothesis works in explaining the current cold peace between Iraq and Israel.  If there was 
continual conflict with Israel, then the hypothesis that Iraq gave up conflict because it could 
never beat Israel is not valid.   
Iraq was part of the first Arab coalition to invade Israel in 1948.  They joined with the 
Jordanian army, and the Arab Liberation Army (Palestinian army) in the center front of the war 
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(Herzog, 49).  After they had made initial gains, they were pushed back behind the U.N. partition 
line where they no longer took part in any battles in Israel proper (Herzog, 68).  Under President 
Arif, Iraq again made a commitment to join the Arab alliance.  This led them to contribute troops 
during the 1967 War.  Even though they did not have to endure battles fought on their soil, they 
were still forced to concede defeat along with their Arab allies (Hunt, 83).  The result of the war 
was that Iraq lost its air force along with its ability to use it to protect their ground movements 
(O’Ballance, 2).   
Iraqi President al-Bakr wanted to be a part of the 1973 War in order to win prestige for 
his country (O’Ballance, 171).  He placed his troops under the command of Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat, and committed his air force to help on the Syrian front.  The stated goal of the 
Iraqi troops was the liberation of Palestine from Israeli rule (O’Ballance, 172).  The Iraqi army 
quickly made their gains and held their line to wait for reinforcements (O’Ballance, 199).  Even 
though they were pushed back, they still believed they could retake the land they lost.  They 
were disappointed that the ceasefire was declared, because they felt they could have achieved 
their objectives if they were given more time (O’Ballance, 320).  Iraq again attacked Israel 
during the Gulf War in 1991.  Saddam fired ten scud missiles into Israel to provoke another war 
with Israel; however, Israel stayed out of the war (Karpin, 350).  Even though Iraq did not take a 
direct role, there are many instances of Iraq helping other groups in fighting against Israel 
(Karpin, 346).   
As shown above, Iraq has fought quite a few conflicts with Israel.  They were very 
persistent in their goal of making Israel a Palestinian state.  For the first two conflicts, Israel 
emerged as the clear cut winner.  However, the 1973 War left the Iraqi army believing that if 
they were given a little more time they could have won the conflict.  This attitude and the fact 
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that Saddam was willing to provoke Israel into another war, gives support why this hypothesis 
has not brought peace between Israel and Iraq. 
Hypothesis # 2 
The second hypothesis to be tested is the internal stability of the Iraqi regime.  First of all 
there were regime turnovers following the Iraqi defeats following the 1967 War due in part to 
their loss to Israel.  The Ba’ath party led a coup that overthrew Arif (Hunt, 82).  However, this 
was not the only time power changed hands in Iraq.  Following disenchantment with British 
influence and the loss of the 1948 War, the Iraqi army launched a coup that dethroned and killed 
King Faysal in 1958 (Dawisha, 146).  In 1963 the Ba’athist coup ended the Quasim era.  This 
lasted till the second coup launched in 1968 (Dawisha, 183).  After Saddam Hussein came to 
power there was stability in that there were no more coups on the part of the army.  However, 
there was still internal disorder.  The Kurds were especially problematic.  Ever since the Quasim 
years, they have fought the Iraqi government for their independence (Hunt, 96).  The Shi’a have 
also engaged in insurrections to get their say in the government.  This was especially true since 
they make up the ethnic majority in the country (Dawisha, 264).  Even though Iraq has 
experienced internal turmoil since the days it achieved independence, they have engaged in 
conflict with Israel.  As shown above, they have fought or supported the enemies of Israel during 
times of internal duress.  This is especially true under Saddam during the Iran and Gulf Wars.  
He repressed and kept the minority under control (Dawisha, 226).  However, there is some 





Figure 2 Internal Conflict 
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Ba’ath party coups to replace the President of 
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As the case study and the figure above suggests, there was a lot of internal turmoil in Iraq 
during the test period.  Iraq had to deal with changes of government following coups; they also 
had to deal with separatist conflicts with the Kurdish north and Shi’a south.  However, by 
looking at the chart none of these incidents occurred when Iraq was at war with Israel.  True that 
some internal unrest followed these wars, but the key is that they followed the conflict and did 
not precede the conflict.   This table and correlating data shows that this hypothesis does not 
account for the peace between Israel and Iraq. 
Hypothesis # 3 
In March 2003, Iraq was occupied under the forces of the United States, so since they are 
under occupation this could account for the peace between Iraq and Israel (Hunt, 107).  After the 
U.S, invasion in 2003, liberal Iraqis were elected to the new parliament.  One of these is Mithal 
al-Alusi.  As a Member of Parliament, he has been to visit Israel, the first official to do so 
publicly.  In parliament he has advocated for a thawing in relations with Israel.  He is making 
some progress, so it is hopeful that he can bring Iraq into a more peaceful relationship with Israel 
(Rosenberg, 287). 
 Foreign intervention has been prevalent in Iraq.  There seems to always be a foreign 
overlord that helps dictate the foreign affairs of the Iraqi state.  After World War I, the British 
gained the territory of Iraq from the Ottomans.  They established a presence there that lasted till 
King Faysal II was assassinated during the coup of 1958 (Dawisha, 146).  Even though there was 
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a strong British force in the country that did not stop Iraq from invading Israel.  Under the 
influence of Britain they still took part of the conflict of 1948 (Herzog, 49).  Iraq tried to say 
clear of foreign influence, though it received much aid from the Soviets who did not follow a 
pro-Israel policy.  They received most of their arms via the Soviet Union till the Soviet collapse 
(www.sipri.org).  This could help explain Iraq’s policy since it would do as the Soviets said in 
regard to engaging in conflict (Dawisha, 213).  The dynamic changed on March 19, 2003 when 
the United States coalition invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein (Hunt, 106).  In the 
aftermath, the United States poured a tremendous amount of money into the reconstruction of 
Iraq.  According the Sipri database the amount of U.S. weapons aid to Iraq was $256 million 
(www.sipri.com).  As of January 8
th
, 2010 there are 112, 000 U.S. troops in Iraq, meaning that 
the Iraqi army is not strong enough to be a regional threat (Brook, 8A).  The United States has 
given $300 million in economic loans to Iraq to get their economy started again 
(www.usaid.gov).  With all this aid it seems perfectly logical that Iraq would want to keep the 
United States happy, and one way to do that is not make threats against America’s ally Israel. 
 While not foreign intervention, per se, Iraq was preoccupied with an international event 
that precluded war with Israel from late 1979 until the Gulf War.  That event was the Iran-Iraq 
War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988.  Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 in order to gain the Arab oil 
province in Iran.  Also it was an ideal time because Iran was in disarray after the fall of the Shah 
(Dawisha, 223).  Iraq made quick gains, but the Iranian counterattack threw the Iraqis out of Iran.  
The war then settled into a stalemate, with neither side gaining much traction.  Both sides signed 
a ceasefire in 1988, ending the catastrophic war (Hunt, 94).  Just two years after ending the Iran 
war, Iraq was at war with the United States over their illegal annexation of Kuwait (Dawisha, 
224).  This international conflict left the Iraqis little time to fight the Israeli’s in a traditional war.  
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They could not afford a two front war.  This also leads credence to international intervention 
being used to keep the cold peace between Israel and Iraq.  Iraq was too busy fighting another 
foreign power to have time to deal with Israel. 
 Foreign intervention seems to be a shadow on Iraq.  First it was the British under the 
monarchy, then it went to the Soviets, and finally to the United States when they occupied the 
country in 2003.  One can see the influences the aid given by these countries had on Iraq’s 
foreign policy.  They followed a policy that was friendly to the interests of the major aid giver.  
Also the Iran-Iraq war fits into this category because an international event tied up the Iraqi 
army.  As a result they did not possess the resources to wage a conflict against Israel during this 
war.  Due to the evidence presented, it is likely that foreign aid/action is a possible explanation 
of the cold peace between Israel and Iraq. 
Hypothesis # 4 
 The fourth hypothesis to be tested is why Iraq went nuclear.  Iraq did try to build a 
nuclear reactor.  They received aid from the French to build a reactor, ostensibly for civilian 
purposes (Karsh, 94).  Israel perceived that Iraq was using the Osiraq reactor to make a nuclear 
bomb.  They found this to be unacceptable, so they bombed the reactor before it was completed 
(Karpin, 349).  In this case the security dilemma led to conflict between the two countries.  If 
Saddam was to build a nuclear bomb it is thought he would not use it for deterrent purposes.  He 
would use it to bully Israel into making concessions that would harm them as a nation just like he 
used chemical weapons to subdue the internal rebellions (Hunt, 95).  This shows that Saddam 
would not use his nuclear power for deterrence purposes.  He would use it to achieve the long 
stated objective of wiping Israel off of the map (O’Ballance, 172).  So while nuclear arms did 
bring destabilization, it is good that Israel acted when it did.  The results of Iraq having a nuclear 
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bomb are too horrendous for the region to contemplate.  In this case a counterbalance to Israel’s 
nuclear program did not bring peace as the deterrence explanation in the literature review section 
had hoped. 
 Iraq proliferated due to its insecurity that was brought about by Israel proliferating in 
1967.  They felt that if they had a bomb it would deter any Israeli aggression.  The problem was 
that the bomb was developed under the auspices of Saddam Hussein.  His disregard for life and 
desire to see the Israeli state annihilated, meant that a nuclear Iraq would be a threat to Israel and 
the surrounding countries as Saddam sought to expand his power.  Israel took the right steps 
when it destroyed their reactor.  While Iraq had the bomb it did bring instability to the region, but 
now that it no longer exists the hypothesis is moot. 
Hypothesis # 5 
 The last hypothesis to be tested is if Israel’s nuclear program brought about the cold 
peace between Iraq and Israel.  Right off there are problems with this theory.  Israel proliferated 
in 1967 (Karpin, 271).  However, Israel and Iraq have fought in the 1973 War and also there is 
the problem of the Scud missiles during the Gulf War.  During the 1973 War, there was an 
interesting development.  The 1948 War saw the Iraqi army trying to destroy the Israeli state 
(Herzog, 56).  Meaning they fought with Israeli forces inside what was internationally 
recognized as Jewish territory.  In the 1973 War, they were ordered by the Jordanians and 
Syrians not to cross into Israel proper (Karsh, 86).  They knew this would allow Israel to use its 
nuclear option to defend itself as a state (Rosenberg, 177).  This is also interesting in explaining 
the Scud attacks against Israel during the first Gulf War.  General Sada, head of the Iraqi air 
force, was called by Saddam to launch a chemical air attack against Israel.  General Sada, in his 
interview with Mr. Rosenberg, said that such a move would mean Israel would gain justification 
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for nuking Iraq’s main cities.  Therefore the small scud attack was the compromise (Rosenberg, 
177).  There was inconclusive evidence that Israel’s nuclear arms had any effect on Iraq during 
the 1973 War.  It could be assumed this was it was too soon after Israel proliferated (and Israel 
still kept it a secret) Iraq took the chance that Israel was not a nuclear state.  Karsh argues that 
Iraq has stepped down its violence against Israel in large part because Israel is now a nuclear 
power (Karsh, 87).  Other scholars have chimed in to support the fact that Israel having nuclear 
weapons has brought peace between Israel and Iraq (Maoz, 44). 
Conclusion 
Iraq has proved to be a very interesting case study.  All of the hypotheses are present, and 
almost all seem to explain the cold peace that currently exists between Israel and Iraq.  The 
occupation of Iraq, the actions of current politicians, foreign aid, and Israeli nuclear deterrence 
all seem to play a role in this cold peace.  Iraq having nuclear arms was shown to be a 
destabilizing factor in the region, but it has been eliminated since the bombing of the Osiraq 
reactor.  Finally, with numerous conflicts between Iraq and Israel up to Saddam’s disposal has 
shown that Iraq was not willing to concede that Israel was their better militarily.         
Case Study #2 Egypt 
 Egypt is another interesting example of a cold peace.  Ever since Israel was created in 
1948, their main enemy seemed to be Egypt.  Every conflict that Israel was involved in from 
1948 until 1973 involved Egypt.  With such a hatred for each other it seemed that peace would 
never come between the two belligerents.  However, in 1979 peace between the two countries 
was established, and since then some cooperation has taken place.  This has brought benefit to 
both countries as will be shown below.  How was it that two enemies who had fought each other 
so long could come together and make peace? 
 33 
Hypothesis # 1 
 The first hypothesis to be tested is again that after so many defeats by Israel, Egypt saw 
they could not win, and decided to make peace and accept the fact that Israel was not going 
away.  The evidence below will show the conflicts Israel and Egypt had with each other, and if 
Egypt truly believed that they would never beat Israel.  If they believed that, and their army was 
always routed, then this hypothesis could be a contributing factor to the peace that exists between 
Egypt and Israel. 
 Egypt was one of the primary contributors of armed forces against Israel in the 1948 War 
(Herzog, 23).  On the 14
th
 of May, the Egyptian army invaded southern Palestine.  This was their 
drive to make sure Israel was a state controlled by the Palestinians (Herzog, 42).  Even though 
the Egyptian army advanced as far as Tel Aviv, they were pushed back due to their defunct 
weapons.  By the time the ceasefire was declared, Egypt only retained control of the Gaza strip 
(Perry, 86).  The Egyptians were mad that they lost, and soon a new leader (Nasser) emerged that 
promised to make everything better.  Until his army was rebuilt, Nasser supported Palestinian 
raids into Israel to destabilize that state (Herzog, 111).  Nasser entered into an agreement with 
the Soviet bloc to receive modern weapons.  He then began to nationalize the Suez Canal and 
ordered the British to leave.  He then blockaded Israeli shipping out of the Straits of Tiran 
(Herzog, 113).  England and France were upset that they had lost the Suez Canal and plotted 
with Israel to wage a war to get it back (Perry, 97).  The end result was that the Egyptian army 
kept the French and British forces from seizing the canal, and allowed them to strike back 
against Israel.  The resulting victory built up Egyptian esteem (Herzog, 139). 
 Emboldened by his victory in the Suez, Nasser moved to rebuild the old alliance and 
attack Israel again.  He made pacts with Syria and Jordan for a coordinated assault.  He also 
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began moving his forces into the Sinai along the Israeli border after he ordered the U.N. 
peacekeeping mission out (Herzog, 149).  Nasser began speaking that he was getting ready to 
wipe the Jewish state off the map.  The Israelis began to be anxious (Goldschmidt, 146).  This 
anxiety of always worrying about an Arab attack led to the development of their nuclear program 
in 1967 (Karpin, 29).  This led them to prepare for their pre emptive assault.  In a surprise attack, 
Israel knocked out Egypt’s air force and invaded.  They quickly conquered the Sinai, entered the 
West Bank, and took the Golan Heights.  The war was over in six days (Perry, 107).  There was 
speculation that if Egypt was not taken by surprise or if they had all of their army to face Israel 
(some of their forces were fighting in Yemen) the outcome would have been different 
(Goldschmidt, 143).   
 The final conflict that took place was the 1973 War.  Anwar Sadat was the new President 
and he began making preparations to regain the land they had lost in the 1967 War.  He entered 
into an agreement with the Soviets to buy more equipment and have them train his army 
(O’Ballance, 3).  He also set about rebuilding the old anti Israel alliance (O’Ballance, 5).  Once 
this was in place, he was ready to make his move.  He even publicized that war was coming 
quickly for Israel, but the Israelis paid no heed to the warnings.  Sadat even wanted to pursue 
peace, but the United States would not pressure Israel to enter the negotiations (Perry, 113).   On 
October 6, 1973 Egyptian troops crossed the Suez and quickly regained the Sinai from the 
Israelis (O’Ballance, 71).  After initial setbacks and after receiving a lot of military aid from the 
United States, the Israelis were able to counterattack and drive the Egyptians back into Egypt 
(Goldschmidt, 167).  A ceasefire was soon brokered and the fighting stopped.  After that conflict 
no more war has erupted between Israel and Egypt.  These wars showed that Egypt was not 
concerned about loses to Israel, they were after an ultimate objective.  The Egyptian army 
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showed that they were a match for Israel during the 1973 War.  Due to this evidence, it is safe to 
state that this hypothesis does not explain the peace between Israel and Egypt. 
 Egypt and Israel have had a very tense relationship.  Ever since Israel became a state, 
they have had to defend against Egypt.  From wars to isolated conflicts on the Sinai, Egypt and 
Israel have locked horns.  Egyptian successes during the Suez Crisis and the 1973 War prove that 
the Egyptian army was more than capable of handling the Israeli army.  In the circumstances that 
the Egyptians were defeated, it was due to factors beyond their control.  The aid provided to 
Israel during its darkest hour by the American government showed Egypt that they could not 
militarily beat Israel.  This factor could lead to why Egypt decided peace, not war, was the route 
to take with Israel 
Hypothesis # 2 
 Egypt has had a history of remarkable political stability.  If they were unstable, according 
to figure one, there should have been less conflict between the two countries.  They have had 
only one violent change of power in their central government.  That was when the Free Officers 
overthrew the monarchy.  There was widespread discontent with the monarchy and the Wafd 
party.  Those two partners were believed to be responsible for the 1948 defeat and the continued 
British occupation of their country.  They launched their coup in 1954 and Nasser came to power 
(Goldschmidt, 104). That regime has continued uninterrupted through the current President 
Mubarak.  Though when power changed from Nasser to Sadat and from Sadat to Mubarak (due 
to their deaths) there was a little uncertainty on who would lead the country; however, the 
successors quickly consolidated their power and internal strife was avoided (Perry, 129).  This 
continued rule has brought political stability to the country since the same group has been 
running the country.  However, there has been internal unrest that occurred during the Sadat 
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years.  When he stopped the subsidies on food, the people revolted and many were killed when 
the Egyptian army put it down.  It was the first time that Egyptian troops had fired on their own 
countrymen (Perry, 126).  There was even the assassination/coup that tried to bring Islamists into 
power in 1981.  It failed, though Sadat was killed his fellow Free Officer Mubarak stayed in 
power (Goldschmidt, 183).  The only problem facing Egypt internally is the rising tide of Islamic 
extremism (Perry, 136). 
Figure 3 Egyptian Coups 
Coup Parties involved Year Winner 
1 Monarchy vs. Free Officers 
under Naguib 
1952 General Naguib 
2 Ahmed Mortada el-Maraghi, 
Hussein Khairy, Mahmoud 
Namek vs. Nasser 
 
1958 General Nasser  
3 Sayed Kotb, Yusuf Hawash, 
Abdul Fattah Ismail vs. Nasser 
 
1965 Nasser 
4 Shamseddin Badran, Abbas 
Radwan, Lt.Col. Haridi, Osman 
Nasser, Salah Nasr vs. Nasser 
 
1967 Nasser 
5  Ali Sabry, Gen. Fawzi 
  v.s. Sadat 
1971 Sadat 
6 Islamist vs. Sadat and Mubarak 1981 Mubarak 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm) 
 The table has shown that there have been many attempted coups in Egypt during the time 
frame presented.  However, of the attempts listed only one succeeded.  That was when the 
military threw off the monarchy.  The other attempts have been meager, and the ruling regime 
was able to easily quell those uprisings.  Sadat was assassinated, but the assassination did not 
bring any change to Egyptian foreign or domestic policy (Goldschmidt, 188).  If the many coups 
were successful, then it would be concluded that Egypt was unstable during the test period.  
Since only one succeeded, it is concluded that Egypt was a stable country.    
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As shown by the evidence above, compared to other countries, Egypt was a politically 
stable country in the Middle East.  Whenever there was unrest in Egypt, they were not engaged 
in conflict with Israel.  The Free Officer movement has maintained power and stability in the 
country.  As the table indicates, and the evidence supports Egypt was stable during the wars with 
Israel.  When they had uprisings they were never severe enough to knock Egypt out of a fight.  
These periods of unrest did not occur during conflict with Israel, so there is no correlation that 
this hypothesis led to the peace between the two states.  Therefore, this hypothesis is not 
responsible for explaining the peace between Israel and Egypt.   
Hypothesis # 3 
 As was the case with Iraq, Egypt has had foreign intervention during its existence as a 
state.  The outlook of the foreign benefactor is important to examine if Egypt pursue friendly or 
hostile relations vis-à-vis to keep their benefactor happy.  Egypt was under the protection of the 
British and had British troops stationed there as a result of defaulting on their debts to Britain in 
1892 (Goldschmidt, 50).  This brought enormous benefit to Britain in the form of cotton and 
from trade from the Suez Canal (Goldschmidt, 59).  Their control over Egyptian life is why the 
Free Officers came to power and booted the British out (Perry, 93).  Their control was ended 
when they lost the Suez War (Goldschmidt, 126).  After they were forced out, Egypt turned to 
the Soviets for aid.  The military aid form the Soviet Union spiked at $2479 million at 1973 
(www.sipri.com).  The Soviets gave separate economic assistance to the Egyptian government so 
they could build the Aswan High Dam (Goldschmidt, 130).  It is logical to conclude that the anti 
Semitic USSR would have great interest in seeing Egypt defeat Israel.  Before Sadat initiated his 
invasion in 1973, he ordered all Soviet advisors out of his country in order to pursue greater ties 
with the West once he had achieved his objectives (Goldschmidt, 160).  In return for keeping the 
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peace with Israel, the United States is now the primary supporter of the Egyptian regime.  In the 
1990s, America provided Egypt over $100 million in arms deals (www.sipri.com).  The United 
States even cancelled Egypt’s $14 billion debt (Perry, 131). 
 All of this external aid has made Egypt susceptible to the wishes of outside powers.  The 
Soviets were pro Arab, so when they aided one expects a more hostile stance towards Israel.  The 
United States, who is friendly to Israel, gives aid then it is expected there is peace between that 
country and Israel to keep receiving American aid.   From being in economic subservience to 
Britain to depending on the United States for aid, Egypt still relies on external support.  Such 
support usually comes with strings.  With Britain, the British controlled the ministries and got to 
profit from Egypt’s economy (Goldschmidt, 58).  With the United States, the cost of our help is 
keeping the peace with Israel.  This shows that there is strong support that this hypothesis 
supports why there is peace between Israel and Egypt. 
Hypothesis # 4 
 This was a very hard hypothesis to test, mainly due to the fact that Egypt never 
proliferated.  The article by Rosen gives the best insight into this area.  In it he states that several 
states (India or America) were willing to give nuclear assistance to moderate Arab regimes in 
order to create balance with nuclear Israel (Rosen, 1369).  Nasser wanted a nuclear regime to 
offset Israel’s dominance, but he was not able to get it because the United States was not willing 
to give nuclear aid to a pro Soviet regime.  However, this has not come about.  There was a 
problem with raising the money needed to continue, and the United States did not view Nasser as 
a moderate regime (Karpin, 81).  Mainly due to the fear that these countries might fall into the 
hands of the radicals, and Western governments do not want radicals having a nuclear bomb.  
This is true in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood who has stated they do not want peace with 
 39 
Israel (Goldschmidt, 182).  All this would indicate that if Egypt proliferated then it would not 
bring peace as the literature review suggested.  It would only escalate the conflict in the Levant.  
Since Egypt never proliferated, nothing more can be done with this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis # 5 
 Now comes the heart of the matter, has Israel’s nuclear program brought about this cold 
peace?  As stated above, when there was outright war between Egypt and Israel, Egypt stated 
that they wanted to wipe Israel off of the map (Goldschmidt, 146).  However, Sadat commanded 
his troops during the 1973 invasion that they were only to get back the territory lost from the 
1967 War.  They were not supposed to invade Israel proper (Goldschmidt, 164).  Why this about 
face?  One explanation is the fact that Israel had not annexed the Sinai yet, so they could take it 
back without Israeli nuclear retaliation (Karpin, 346).  As General Sada in his interview with Mr. 
Rosenberg stated, if Israel herself was attacked then it could justify nuking Egypt (Rosenberg, 
177).  One of the main reasons Sadat gave for his support for peace with Israel was that he was 
afraid of their nuclear program (Karsh, 86).   
 The evidence presented above shows there is a linkage between nuclear arms and the 
peace between Egypt and Israel.  Egypt launched its attack in order to make peace with Israel 
and regain its lost territory in 1973.  Their limited mission was due to the fear of Israel reacting 
with nuclear force.  They had to make sure that they did not provoke a nuclear option during 
their operation.  It was a dangerous line to walk, but the Egyptians pulled it off.  From the 






 Like Iraq, many of the hypotheses presented in this paper are found in Egypt.  Egypt has 
fought many wars with Israel.  In fact, they were seen to be their arch rival.  Even though they 
were defeated, gaining ground during the last conflicts show that in time Egypt could have been 
on par with or defeated Israeli military units.  Egypt has had a history of political stability 
following the rise of the Free Officer movement, so internal conflict has not brought about peace 
with Israel.  Egypt has a history of foreign intervention, and as shown above, this has a strong 
impact on Egypt’s relations with Israel.  Egypt proliferating is negligible.  Finally, evidence was 
presented that show that there is a link between Israel’s nuclear program and Egypt seeking 
peace with them.  It is resolved that foreign intervention and to some degree nuclear deterrence 
has brought about the Egyptian-Israeli peace. 
Case Study #3 Jordan 
The Jordanian case is a paradox.  On the one hand they have been involved in every 
major war against Israel (1948, 1967, and 1973).  However, at the same time the Jordanian 
government was working on achieving peace with the Israeli state.  That goal became reality, 
and Jordan became the second (and most recent) Arab state to establish diplomatic ties with 
Israel.  What led to peace triumphing over conflict?  
Hypothesis # 1 
 As mentioned in the opening statement, Jordan has been involved in every major conflict 
against Israel since the 1948 War for Independence.  This section will examine the events 
leading up to the conflicts.  Examined will be events that occurred during the conflicts and 
afterwards.  By looking at these factors, it is hoped that it will give insight into the motivations of 
the Jordanian government and military in regard to engaging in conflict with Israel.  If they 
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decided that they could not beat Israel in a military fashion, then maybe they decided to pursue 
peace with the Israeli state. 
As part of the McMahon – Hussein correspondence that brought the Arabs into the side 
of the British in World War I, the Arabs were supposed to have their own state.  However, the 
French disposed of Faysal in Damascus.  Faysal’s brother, Abdullah, marched with 300 men to 
help his brother reclaim his throne.  The British interceded and in return for the halt of his march, 
he was given control over the mandate of Transjordan (Robins, 17).  The British were very 
instrumental in supporting Abdullah’s reign.  They even sent their army officers to train and 
officer the Arab Legion (Jordan’s army).  At the time of the 1948 War, this allowed Jordan to 
have one of the most modern army of the Arab alliance (Herzog, 23).  This helps explain that the 
Jordanian army should have been the equal to or the better army compared to the Israeli 
Haganah.  This leads support that Jordan did not believe it could lose a war against Israel.  
 When war broke out in 1948, the aim of the Arab Legion was to occupy the lands that 
were supposed to be an Arab state.  This was in response to the deal struck between King 
Abdullah, the British, and the Jewish Agency (Robins, 61).  The Arab Legion advanced to the 
partition line, and then dug in.  For some reason Israel forgot its end of the bargain and tried to 
take some of the land that was supposed to go the Arab state.  The Arab Legion under the 
command of the British Commander Glubb held onto East Jerusalem and the lands of what 
became the West Bank (Herzog, 44-45).  The ceasefire saw that the West Bank remained in the 
hands of the Jordanians (Robins, 66).  It can be argued that the Jordanian army was successful in 
this undertaking.  Therefore, the outcome 1948 War does not support this hypothesis.   
 Here comes the paradox part.  Having obtained their objective in taking control of the 
West Bank, why did Jordan fight Israel during the 1967 War?  The answer is one of the saddest 
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in history.  Under King Hussein, Jordan entered into negotiations to join the Egyptian-Syrian 
alliance against Israel.  The role of the Jordanians was to act as a diversion to keep Israel 
distracted while the other two armies attacked the divided Israeli force (Dallas, 113).  However, 
wanting to please the Arabs, King Hussein ordered his forces to go on the offensive, instead of a 
defensive role the other two states wanted.  This decision was made in part based on the false 
belief that the Egyptian air force was bombing Israel (Dallas, 117).  The Israeli army quickly 
captured East Jerusalem, and pushed the Arab Legion back across the Jordan River (Herzog, 
183).  The ceasefire saw the West Bank pass into Israeli hands.  So far this appears to support the 
hypothesis.  Jordan had suffered this massive humiliation, and it appeared futile to try to get the 
upper hand against Israel in another war.  However, Jordan thought it could retain its lost 
territory.  Therefore, this hypothesis is again invalid. 
 Jordan joined Egypt and Syria in the 1973 War in order to regain the territories lost in the 
1967 War.  With the beginning of war, Sadat encouraged Jordan to stay out due to the fact there 
was no reason for the Jordanian army to be deployed.  This changed as the war became more 
protracted and Egypt needed Jordan’s help (Robins, 141).  Due to this mass confusion, the 
Jordanians did not take a proactive part in the fighting.  By the time they arrived to help the 
Syrians at the Golan Heights, the war was practically over (Robins, 141).  The Egyptian army 
was responsible for operations in the West Bank, but the Israelis pushed them out when they 
counterattacked (O’Ballance. 250).  The end of the war did not bring the West Bank to the 
control of the Jordanians. 
 When hostilities broke out in 1948, Jordan had the best army trained to fight the Israelis.  
After Glubb Pasha was sacked, the army fell into bad shape.  This explains their poor 
performance in later wars.  Once Jordan found out they could not regain their land via war 
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because the United States would make sure Israel never was defeated, they realized that war was 
not the answer, so they sued for peace.  This result gives credence that this hypothesis is good for 
explaining the peace between Israel and Jordan.  
 After the 1948 War, Jordan annexed the West Bank.  King Abdullah allowed the citizens 
there to become Jordanian citizens (Robins, 71).  Unfortunately, when King Hussein sacked 
Glubb, he seriously weakened his Arab Legion (Dallas, 55).  Therefore, Jordan’s army was not 
as strong as it was in 1948.  It was being rebuilt, but mistakes by the government made sure it 
was not used effectively (Dallas, 113).  When Jordan saw how the United States airlifted massive 
weapons shipments to Israel during the darkest days of the 1973 War, they realized that they 
could not compete against an army that had the backing of a superpower (O’Ballance, 222).  This 
is especially true, given how they were so close to victory, they knew that the U.S. would never 
let Israel be defeated in a traditional war.  Also Israel annexed the West Bank, and Israeli settlers 
began to settle the area.  Plus the P.L.O. (Palestinian Liberation Organization) was pushing for a 
two state solution.  They wanted their own state, and did not want to be in a union with Jordan.  
The reason for why Jordan had gone to war with Israel was now moot (Dallas, 271).  These 
factors led to King Hussein to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1993 (Robins, 186). 
Hypothesis # 2 
 Even though Jordan had external backing in its formative year with Great Britain, there 
were still attempts to sow unrest in the Kingdom.  In 1951, King Abdullah went to the Mosque in 
Jerusalem to pray.  Afterwards he hoped to enter into negations for peace with Israel (Dallas, 1).  
The Palestinians heard of his purpose, and sent assassins to stop him from making peace with 
Israel.  A member of the Jerusalem Palestinian militia shot and killed King Abdullah in the Al-
Aqsa mosque (Robins, 75).   
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 This was just the foreshadowing of the trouble the Palestinians would cause to the 
Kingdom of Jordan.  In November 1971, Palestinian guerillas killed the Jordanian prime minister 
in Cairo (Dallas 141).  The Palestinian group Black September used Jordan as a base to carry out 
attacks against Israel and her allies (Dallas, 144).  The Palestinian terror groups would base their 
operations out of Jordan.  They hijacked four Israeli passenger jets and landed them on 
improvised airstrips in Jordan (Robins, 130).   They did this to show King Hussein had no 
control over his territory, and to begin to set up a Palestinian state in Jordan.  They were involved 
in many assassination attempts on the life of the King (Robins, 129).  The King finally declared 
martial law, and the Arab Legion expelled the P.L.O. from Jordan (Robins, 132). 
 In addition to the Palestinian uprisings there were several coup attempts in Jordan (see 
figure below).  The table below gives a summary from the center for systemic peace.  Mainly the 
coups did not involve very many plotters, and very little disruption occurred when they were 
launched.  Thanks to American aid, the government was able to suppress these coup attempts 
(Dallas, 133).  Also these coups happened in the spans that there was no conflict with Israel.  
Therefore, it can be assumed that there is no connection with Israeli activity and these coups.  
Also these coups were over by the time fighting renewed.  As a result, they are an unlikely 








Figure 4 Coups in Jordan 
Date Parties Involved Winner 
1957 Maj-Gen. Abu Nuwar 
vs. King Hussein 
King Hussein 









 Jordan tried to be a friend to the Palestinian people, but the Palestinians tried to 
overthrow the monarchy multiple times.  Jordan allowed the PLO to operate in its country, but 
they used Jordan as a base to conduct terror attacks and they tried to supplant the Jordanian state 
by a Palestinian one.  In spite of these shortcomings, Jordan has always been an ally to the 
Palestinian cause.  King Hussein even tried to get the P.L.O. into peace talks with Israel (Dallas, 
226).  The war with the Palestinians did not have an effect on the policy of Jordan seeking peace 
with Israel.  They also did not occur within the time frame of hostilities between the two 
countries.  Therefore, it is concluded, that these internal unrests do not have an effect on the 
peace/hostile relations between Israel and Jordan. 
Hypothesis # 3 
 As discussed above, the British had a high degree of influence in King Abdullah’s 
Jordan.  They helped him establish a state.  They gave him economic and military aid (Robins, 
17).  It stands to reason that Jordan would be willing to follow what its main benefactor wanted.  
They invaded the West Bank in 1948 in agreement with Britain to keep British influence in 
Palestine (Herzog, 23).  When King Hussein came to power, he bucked British influence since it 
was unpopular (Dallas, 55).  As the British wanted to use Jordan to keep its influence in 
Palestine, no more British influence could mean peace could be reached between the two 
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countries.  Relations never did completely cease between the two countries, when his regime was 
threatened the British came to his aid (Robins, 104). 
 King Hussein played the peace card to gain economic aid from the United States.  When 
King Hussein signed a peace agreement with Israel, $950 million of their debt to the United 
States was forgiven (Robins, 186).  The United States also gave aid to King Hussein because 
they were worried that Soviet inspired radicals would topple his regime (Dallas, 133).  The aid 
provided by the United States was to jumpstart Jordan’s economy.  U.S. military aid only totaled 
$4119 million from 1973 till 2008 (www.sipri.com).   
 As the evidence shows, the foreign aid to Jordan was the result of Jordan manipulating 
the great powers that were sympathetic to their goals.  They received aid from Britain in order to 
make sure British influence survived in the region.  As the first hypothesis shows, Britain invited 
Jordan to invade Israel in 1948.  British influence did not bring about peace between Israel and 
Jordan.  Jordan received U.S. aid because the U.S. was friendly with Israel, could support 
Jordan’s aim for the West Bank, and they did not want Jordan to side with the Soviets as Iraq and 
Nasser’s Egypt had done.  The evidence shows that foreign aid did not shape Jordan’s policy 
towards Israel.  If this was the case then Jordan would have taken the side of the U.S. in disputes 
in the region.  However, Jordan did not support the invasion of Iraq during both Gulf Wars 
(Robins, 181).   It just highlighted the goals of the King of Jordan. 
Hypothesis # 4 
 In the case of Jordan this hypothesis is negligible.  Even though some western states 
wanted to aid moderate Arab regimes to proliferate, Jordan chose not to pursue the nuclear path 
(Rosen, 1369).  This was wise on their part because they realized that Israel would never allow 
them to proliferate.  They saw that Israel would use force to take out any reactors in hostile 
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countries, as exemplified in the Osiraq debacle (Karsh, 160).  Jordan realized that proliferating 
would only bring conflict with Israel, and Jordan did not want to invite another war with Israel 
(Dallas, 271). 
Hypothesis # 5 
 As to the question if Israel’s nuclear program deterred Jordan from attacking, it can be 
safely concluded that it has not.  As the evidence provided above points out; Jordan never 
wanted to annihilate the Jewish state they just wanted to annex the West Bank (Robins, 61).  
Since they did not want to destroy the state of Israel, they knew Israel would not nuke them.  
Israel would only use its nuclear program when there states was about to be overwhelmed by an 
invading force.  Since Jordan always limited their operations to the West Bank, they proved to 
Israel they were not a threat in the regard that would have warranted Israel pursuing its nuclear 
option.  No direct evidence can be cited that prove that Jordan was deterred by Israel 
proliferating.  Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence that suggests that Israel having nuclear 
capability led Jordan to sign a peace with Israel.  The previous hypothesis gave a better 
explanation for the resulting peace.    
The General Sada argument can be assumed to have taken a part (Rosenberg, 177).  
Jordan could justify its attacks on Israel in order to get their lands back under U.N. Resolution 
242 (Dallas, 124).  However, once Israel annexed the West Bank and sent in settlers to claim the 
region, Jordan could no longer justify the attack since Israel had claim to the West Bank 
(possession is 9/10 of the law) (Dallas, 271).  If they did, according to General Sada’s case with 
Iraq, Israel could retaliate with its nuclear arsenal (Rosenberg, 171).  Again Israel only states its 
only reason for nuclear arms is defensive.  Therefore, they never had to worry about using them 
against Jordan (Bell, 384). 
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As stated there is no evidence from Jordan or other sources that claim that they signed a 
peace with Israel due to Israel having nuclear arms.  Jordan continued in conflict with Israel after 
Israel proliferated.  This evidence, taken together, makes this hypothesis appear moot.  While 
there is no evidence to support this directly, General Sada’s argument could have had a bearing 
on Jordan thinking about attacking the Israeli claimed West Bank and attacking Jewish settlers.  
This could have allowed the justification for Israel to defend its existence as a state. 
Conclusion 
 As the case study about Jordan shows, their relationship with Israel is a paradox.  They 
fought Israel in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 Wars.  However, at the same time their government 
was working to establish peace between the two countries.  Through testing all five hypotheses, 
it can safely be concluded that the first hypothesis provides the best explanation for why there is 
peace between Israel and Jordan.  Israel’s nuclear program needs more evidence before it can be 
safely concluded that it had an impact on Jordan signing a peace treaty with Israel. 
Case Study #4 Lebanon 
 Lebanon is another very interesting case study.  Actors from Lebanon have been involved 
in conflict with Israel ever since the 1948 War for Independence.  Not all of these involved have 
the Lebanese army as a participant.  Recently the conflicts are between Israel and Hezbollah (a 
group who is based out of Lebanon).  This case study will look at the five hypotheses to see if 
any have led to a peace between Lebanon and Israel.  
Hypothesis # 1 
 Israel and Lebanese actors have been locked in a continual struggle.  There has been 
conflict from 1948 up till the present day.  This section will look at all the conflicts between 
Israel and Lebanon to determine what caused them, how they progressed, and finally what steps 
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have been taken to end the conflicts.  This will held determine if Lebanon finally decided that 
they could not beat Israel, and that is why there is a cold peace. 
 Lebanon was involved in the 1948 War.  They sent 2,000 men to fight with the 
Palestinians (Herzog, 23).  Their army advanced and their forces laid siege to Malikaya, Israel.  
The Israeli counteroffensive pushed the Lebanese back into Lebanon (Traboulsi, 113).  Israeli 
forces then invaded and occupied the western part of Lebanon (Herzog, 91).  After the Egyptians 
signed the ceasefire, Lebanon followed suit.  On March 23, 1949 they signed a ceasefire with 
Israel, and Israel withdrew from the occupied parts of Lebanon (Traboulsi, 113).  This ended 
direct confrontation between the Israelis and the Lebanese army.  There is inconclusive evidence 
that Lebanon was sore over their defeat and plotting to engage in another war with Israel.  Events 
would transpire in Lebanon, that even if there was a plot to renew the war, would keep that from 
happening.  This will be examined in the next section.     
Lebanon did not actively take part in the 1967 War, mainly because they were in the 
midst of a Civil War.  Therefore, Israel knew that they were not involved in Nasser’s plot to 
attack (Herzog, 145).  As a result of the war, Lebanon inherited 120,000 Palestinian refugees 
(Traboulsi, 113).  Many of these Palestinians formed guerilla groups to fight Israel (Traboulsi, 
152).  These militants would invite further action from Israel.  Lebanon was not involved in the 
1973 War, though their airspace was infringed upon multiple times by both Israel and Syria 
during the conflict (O’Ballance, 214 and 291).  When Syrian troops tried to access Israel via 
Lebanon, the Lebanese troops detained them.  This shows that Lebanon wanted no part in a 
confrontation with Israel.  Lebanon feared another occupation from their powerful southern 
neighbor (O’Ballance, 214).    
 50 
While the army of Lebanon was not involved in a confrontation with Israel since the 
1948 War, non state actors based in Lebanon have continued to attack Israel.  This needs to be 
addressed, because some would argue that this constitutes conflict between Israel and Lebanon.  
This section will address this charge.  The P.L.O. set up bases in southern Lebanon to attack 
Northern Israel (Traboulsi, 152).  Israel responded and got rid of the P.L.O. themselves in 
Lebanon during the 1980 “Operation Peace for Galilee” (Traboulsi, 214).  The Palestinians were 
replaced by Hezbollah, the radical Shi’a militant group.  From their strongholds in Southern 
Lebanon they launched missile and commando raids into Israel.  The most recent one involved 
was the 34 Day War in 2006 in which Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers (Harel et al, 3).  
Israel launched a raid into Lebanon to recapture the two soldiers and destroy Hezbollah.  Israel 
was unable to accomplish any of its objectives and after 34 days withdrew due to internal public 
pressure (Harel et al, 241).  Hezbollah claimed that they won the conflict (Harel et al, 249). 
Conflict between Israel and the army of Lebanon ended with the ceasefire of 1949.  The 
evidence shows that Lebanese forces not fighting Israel was not due to the fact that they felt that 
they could no longer beat Israel.  There was not a strong of conflicts between the two countries 
to adequately test this hypothesis to determine if any learning occurred.  The next two sections 
will explain why no more conflict occurred between these two actors.  The evidence 
demonstrates that Lebanon was pre occupied during this time, thereby not having the resources 
needed to mount another offensive against Israel.  It should also be noted that conflict between 
the Lebanese group Hezbollah and Israel continues (Harel et al, 260).  Thereby, suggesting that 




Hypothesis # 2 
 As noted above Israel and Lebanese army have not fought each other since 1949.  This 
section will look into Lebanon’s deeply troubled internal politics to see if the answer lies here.  
The section will mainly deal with the numerous civil disturbances that have plagued Lebanon.  
This criterion will be examined to see if it explains why there is a cold peace between Israel and 
Lebanon.   
 Nasser (of Egypt) was not supportive of the regime of Lebanon, primarily because he felt 
the majority Christian government needed to be replaced by a Muslim one.  His forces covertly 
helped ferment a civil war there in 1958.  The conflict threatened the status quo of the region 
(pro Western over Nasser) and the sixth fleet of the U.S. Navy had to be deployed to the country 
to keep the regime in power (Herzog, 145).  The war had a total of 1400 deaths on the side of the 
government (http://www.correlatesofwar.org).  The inundation of Palestinians into Lebanon 
following the 1967 War destabilized the fragile balance of power between the many groups.  The 
dominant Christians were now the minority.  The Muslims now wanted to dominate the 
government, but the Christians were not about to hand over their political power (Traboulsi, 
133).  Both sides began to arm.  Civil War broke out on April 13, 1973 (Traboulsi, 251).  The 
Christians were led by the Phalange who committed many atrocities to whittle down the number 
of Muslims (Traboulsi, 218).  Atrocities were also perpetrated by the Muslim forces (Traboulsi, 
225).  Recently, the conflict is between pro and anti Syrian parties (Shadid, 16A). 
 Given the evidence presented above, Lebanon has been very unstable.  They have 
endured a civil war in 1958.  The longest lasting and deadliest occurred as groups tried to 
dominate the government started in 1973.  It was only concluded after a Syrian offensive 
disarmed the militias in 1991.  A lot of land was damaged, and 167,000 participants were killed 
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during this long duration of conflict (http://www.correlatesofwar.org).  The effects of which are 
still felt in the present.  Due to this massive internal stability that is a result of these civil wars, it 
is concluded that they left Lebanon too divided to fight a war with Israel.  Hypothesis 2 could be 
responsible for the cold peace between Israel and Lebanon. 
Hypothesis # 3 
 A contributing factor to the instability of Lebanon has been the influence of foreign 
actors in the territory.  This includes the Palestinians, to the Syrians, to the Americans, to the 
Israelis, and to the Iranians.  This section will look at how these forces have tried to bring order 
to the Lebanese state, but ended up making the state more instable.  A side effect to these 
intrusions will be how Lebanon’s relations with Israel have changed.  The evidence will look to 
see if there is correlation between state aid and Lebanon’s stance towards Israel.  
 The Palestinians were introduced into Lebanon following their expulsion following the 
1948 War (Traboulsi, 113).  These groups upset the confessional distribution.  Their presence led 
the Sunni population to believe it should have a bigger say in government since they were now 
the majority.  This led to the Civil War of 1958 (Herzog, 145).  The Palestinian militants were 
expelled when Israel invaded in 1980 (Traboulsi, 214).  The influence of the outside Palestinians 
led Lebanon into conflict with Israel. 
 Israel invaded in “Operation Peace for Galilee” to get rid of the PLO in Lebanon and to 
get a peace treaty signed with Lebanon (Traboulsi, 214).  Their objective was accomplished 
when the P.L.O. militants were banished.  They also got their treaty from Lebanese President 
Bashir Gemayel (Traboulsi, 215).  The negative backlash among the Muslim population led to 
Gemayel’s assassination and the annulment of the treaty (Traboulsi, 215).  Israel then retreated to 
the safety zone they set up in southern Lebanon to stop further attacks on Northern Israel 
 53 
(Herzog, 351).  This occupation led to the rise of Hezbollah.  They have continued to attack 
Israel; this had led to Israeli invasion of Lebanon to stop the attacks (Harel et al, 77).  As will be 
presented in the next section, Hezbollah is a group funded by Syria.  Syria is not known for its 
tolerance of an Israeli state. 
 The Syrians have played an active role in Lebanon.  Syria feels that France partitioned 
Syria to create Lebanon as a Christian state (Traboulsi, 77).  Syria, at the request of the Lebanese 
government, sent in troops to stop the Civil War.  However, they did not end the war.  Their 
presence angered other groups, and was one reason why Israel invaded in 1980 (Herzog, 351).  
Syria has been accused of assassinating Prime Minister Hariri.  Syria finally withdrew from 
Lebanon following this event (Hider, 42).  However; Syria still supports Hezbollah, which wants 
greater ties with Syria (Shadid, 16A).  Syria has given a total of $79 million, as of 2008, in arms 
to the Lebanese army (www.sipri.com).  Iran is helping destabilize the region by supporting 
Hezbollah as well (Shadid, 16A).  Again these actors have led to Israel intervening in Lebanon to 
oust groups that continually attack them.   
 America was also involved in the country.  The U.S. sent in the 6
th
 fleet to prop up the 
regime during the 1958 Civil War (Herzog, 145).  Since the regime was pro West, it can be 
assumed that this is a reason why Lebanon was not involved in the 1967 and 1973 Wars.  U.S. 
forces were also deployed to keep the peace during the 1980s during the Civil War.  The U.S. 
government has given a total of $265 million in arms supplies to Lebanon from 1973 till 2008, 
though it has dropped off lately (www.sipri.com).  With the bombing of the Marine barracks in 
Beirut, public opinion in the U.S. turned against the peacekeeping mission and the forces were 
withdrawn (Traboulsi, 225).  The pro Israeli U.S. helps explain why Lebanon was hesitant in 
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joining operations against Israel.  However, when the U.S. evacuated that guarantee was gone.  
Anti Zionist foreign elements began to dominate Lebanese politics.   
 With Nasser instigating the Civil War of 1958, Lebanon has been privy to outside 
influences.  The P.L.O. instigated the Civil War and invited Israeli intervention to stop attacks.  
This explains why skirmishes occur on Lebanese territory between Lebanese militias and the 
Israeli Defense Forces. These groups make sure Lebanon stays involved in conflict with Israel.  
Israeli presence has also brought difficulties to Israel and the ability for the country to find peace.  
Syria and Iran continue to exert influence on Lebanese policy via Hezbollah.  The United States 
had a role in the region, but the continued unrest led to our withdrawal of peacekeepers.  As the 
evidence suggests, these foreign actors have control over agents in Lebanon that have not led to 
peace but continued conflict with Israel. 
Hypothesis # 4 
 Lebanon never proliferated, so the main reason for this case study is lessened as a result.  
However, it is important to examine if Lebanon ever wanted to proliferate.  Would one of the 
reasons have been to counter Israel’s influence in the region?  This will be examined to see if this 
has any impact on the case study.  Could it be with the other states in the region that tried to 
proliferate, that would only invite further aggression from Israel?  That would not lead to peace 
but continued war in the Levant. 
 Lebanon was formed as a French colony that gave Christians a state in the Levant 
(Traboulsi, 77).  As Lebanon matured as a state, they were seen as a prosperous and stable 
society.  Western investment trickled in (Traboulsi, 109).  Why then did they not proliferate?  
They were moderate and the French could help them proliferate like they did with Israel and Iraq 
(Rosen, 1369).  However; this was the 1950s and Israel had not proliferated yet.  When Israel did 
 55 
proliferate, Lebanon was no loner the stable and prosperous country it once had been.  Civil War 
had decimated their economy, and radical groups like Hezbollah were coming to power.  With 
the growing influence of Hezbollah, why would the Western powers allow a state under 
Hezbollah influence proliferate (Krieger, 45). 
 While Lebanon seemed a prime candidate for a nuclear program in its early years, the 
chance has long past.  When Israel proliferated, Lebanon was no longer a stable country.  
Radical Muslim groups were on the rise.  If Lebanon proliferated, according to Western logic 
shown above, it would be detrimental to peace in the region.  Without outside help, Lebanon can 
not proliferate.  So far no nuclear states see it in their interest to help Lebanon proliferate. 
Hypothesis # 5 
 This brings up the question, did Israel proliferating have anything to do with the cold 
peace between Israel and Lebanon?  The way to test this hypothesis is to see if conflict ended 
between the two countries when Israel proliferated in 1967.  As the evidence above shows, no 
conflict fought between the armies of Lebanon and Israel has occurred since the 1949 ceasefire.  
This happened before Israel proliferated in 1967.  There could be a link that Lebanon was 
discouraged from attacking Israel after Israel proliferated in 1967.  However, the evidence is 
inconclusive.  In regard to non state actors, conflict between them and Israel continued long after 
Israel proliferated.  Here lies the problem with being a nuclear state and dealing with non state 
actors.  How can you destroy your enemy if they are not a state?  This eliminates Israel using its 
nukes to destroy Hezbollah (Schelling, 24).   
 Hezbollah has been making steps to eliminate that problem.  They now employ a political 
wing, which is doing quite well in influencing the government (Shadid, 16A).  This is 
problematic, since they have proven that they are willing to go to war to get occupied Lebanese 
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territory back (Harel et al, 254).  So as it stands right now, deterrence has not brought peace 
between the two countries.  In fact, if Hezbollah gains more political power, another war might 
be around the corner.  Later, this will be addressed as to how Israel can use nuclear deterrence in 
the present to deter any future attacks from Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. 
 The evidence shows that, as of this writing, nuclear deterrence has not brought peace 
between the two countries.  As the rise of Iran and Syria backed Hezbollah, war might be around 
the corner.  While nuclear deterrence is not working right now, it is hoped that the section at the 
end of the paper will resolve this dilemma.  Maybe nuclear deterrence, if employed correctly, can 
bring peace between the two countries. 
Conclusion 
 Lebanon was a very interesting case study.  They were involved with the first war against 
Israel, but have not been involved as a national military in the subsequent wars.  However, 
fighting between guerilla groups and Israel continues into the present day.  The evidence 
presented in this case study lends support that contributing factors of hypotheses two and three 
both explain this phenomenon.  The danger lies in Hezbollah gaining political control of the 
country, as it could lead to this cold peace breaking down.  A later section will address how to 
use Israel’s nuclear program to eliminate this threat and bring peace to the region.   
Case Study #5 Syria 
 This thesis has examined four of the five countries that went to war with Israel during the 
years 1948 till 1973.  The hypotheses have been applied to each case to see which one best 
explains the current cold peace between the countries.  The last country of this old Arab alliance 
system to be considered is Syria.  Syria is unique.  Unlike the other states, which have either 
signed peace treaties with Israel, have internal discord, and/or suffer foreign occupation, Syria 
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still strikes a hostile stance with the state of Israel after the period of major fighting has ceased.  
This case will apply the hypotheses to see why no open conflict has emerged between the armies 
of Israel and Syria. 
Hypothesis # 1 
 Syria was part of the five country Arab alliance that attacked Israel in 1948.  They were 
involved in the other two wars against Israel as well (1967 and 1973).  After the 1973 War, the 
open conflict between the two sides ended even though there was hostility between the two.  
Could it be that Syria finally decided that they could not beat Israel all by themselves?  This 
section will test that possibility.  In order to see if that is the case, all three conflicts will be 
examined.  Also examined will be Syria’s stance towards Israel before and after these conflicts. 
 The Syrians entered the war against Israel in 1948 in order to prevent the creation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine.  The Syrian state was the most anti Zionist Arab state (Ma’oz, 16).  
They invaded the Northern Jewish settlements in an attempt to rid the area of the Jews (Herzog, 
49).  The Syrians also invaded and occupied an area by the Sea of Galilee given to Israel by the 
U.N. partition (Ma’oz, 18).  After the first truce, Israel began to prepare an attack to drive Syria 
out of their positions in Palestine.  The two operations were successful (Herzog, 76).  The 
conclusion:  Syria was a young state whose army was inexperienced, so they let their proxy army 
(Arab Liberation Army) do most of the fighting (Ma’oz, 19).  However, Syria was the last to sign 
an armistice with Israel which shows there was a will to continue the fight.  The land between 
the two countries became a demilitarized zone (Herzog, 105). 
 The time between the 1948 and 1967 War was not a time of peace between Israel and 
Syria.  Israeli and Syrian jets routinely flew into the other’s territory for tactical strikes.  Syria 
said this was to weaken Israel’s resolve to keep control of the occupied territory (Ma’oz, 90-91).  
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Syria joined an alliance with Egypt and Jordan to attack Israel once again to accomplish their 
goal of eliminating the Israeli state.  Troops and equipment began to come to Syria to prepare for 
the upcoming attack (Ma’oz, 100).  Syrian artillery began to shell Jewish settlements in the 
demilitarized zone (Herzog, 148).  This all made Israel very nervous.  Israel launched a surprise 
attack on June 5, 1967 (Herzog, 151).  The Syrian air force was quickly neutralized during its 
raid against Haifa.  Syria tried three probes, but were beaten back (Herzog, 185).  The stalemate 
quickly ended after Israel defeated Egypt.  Israel turned its full force into attacking the Syrian 
Golan Heights.  Thanks to intelligence, the Israeli army was able to quickly find the Syrian 
positions and neutralize them (Herzog, 188).  Israel offered to return the Golan Heights to Syria 
in return for a peace treaty.  The Syrians refused, and with Soviet help, began to prepare for 
another war to take back the land they had lost to Israel (Herzog, 190).  This shows that Syria 
was not interested in peace.  Syria wanted war to either wipe Israel off the map, or get its lost 
territories back.  
 Syria again joined in an alliance with Egypt to attack Israel.  They struck simultaneously 
along their two fronts.  They hoped to catch Israel off guard long enough to regain their 
territories (Herzog, 230).  Note the difference is striking between the goal of Syria previously 
and in regard to the Yom Kippur War.  Beforehand they wanted to destroy Israel, now they 
wanted to just get back their land.  Hypothesis number five will look into this.  The Israelis were 
caught off guard, but fought back ferociously (O’Ballance, 127).  The Syrian army was making 
progress during the early stages of the war, quickly achieving their objectives (O’Ballance, 131).  
Once the Syrians achieved their goal of retaking the Golan Heights they stopped (O’Ballance, 
137).  The Israelis launched a counter offensive, and retook the Golan Heights (Ma’oz, 130).  
Even though the Syrians lost the war, they learned that they were a match for the forces of Israel 
 59 
(O’Ballance, 146).  This seems to show that Syria does not believe that they will continue to lose 
in a future conflict with Israel. 
 It appeared that Syria had gained momentum in being a force to be reckoned with vis-à-
vis Israel.  However, another war would not be coming between Israel and Syria for Syria to 
have the chance to retake the Golan Heights.  Syria was not the strongest state in the Arab 
alliance (Herzog, 145).  As shown in the previous case studies, Syria soon was alone in its hostile 
stance toward Israel.  Egypt and Jordan had signed formal peace treaties with Israel.  Lebanon 
was going through too much internal discord to do anything with Israel, and finally Iraq was 
under the occupation of the United States.  Syria realized they could not fight Israel by 
themselves (Ma’ov, 157).  Therefore, they have embarked on a three part strategy.  One:  they 
are attempting through Turkey to negotiate a peace with Israel (Khasawinah, 1).  Two:  they are 
working to establish a new alliance with anti Israel Iran to start a new war with Iran (Ma’ov, 
187).  Third:  Syria is financing Hezbollah in Lebanon to carry out a proxy war to destabilize 
Israel (Shadid, 16A).   
 The hypothesis shows that Syria was at a disadvantage when they entered into hostilities 
with Israel in 1948.  Over the years they improved their forces with outside assistance.  With 
each new conflict with Israel, the Syrians proved they could hold their own against Israel.  
However; when the other alliance states dropped out of the open conflict stage, Syria was not 
strong enough to start another war with Israel.  They then started talks for peace, but at the same 
time they started looking for new ways to destabilize Israel.  This shows that Syria has not 
learned that they will never beat Israel.  If they had, then why are they still working with groups 
to attack the Israeli state?  While this hypothesis explains why there has not been conflict since 
1973 between these two countries, it also shows that it has not brought peace between the two 
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countries.  Syria has not learned from their defeats.  The reason for the cold peace is due to Syria 
being left alone against Israel. 
Hypothesis # 2 
 At first glance, Syria appears to be a stable country.  They have been ruled by the Ba’ath 
party under the Assad family since 1967.  However, this section will show that Syria has 
experienced some internal unrest, but after the fall of the United Arab Republic, the country was 
stable.  This is due to the fact that one family was able to control power in Syria till the present 
day.  Those cases will be examined.  If the coups occurred during conflict with Israel, then it 
could be surmised that they could have led to defeat due to not being strong enough to pose a 
challenge to Israel.  If they did not occur during conflict with Israel, then this has no bearing on 
what this paper is trying to find out.   The results will be taken to see if they are responsible for 
making Syria too weak to fight Israel.  This will show if it is responsible for the cold peace 
between Israel and Syria. 
Figure 5 Coups in Syria http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
Date Participants Result Deaths 
1949 Col. Hosni Zaim vs. Government Col. Zaim wins 0 
1949 Col. Sami Hinnawi vs. Government Col. Hinnawi victorious 2 
1951 Col. Adib Shishakli vs. Government Col. Shishakli wins 0 
1952 Maj-Gen. Bannud, Lt-Col. Kareem, 
Mahmoud Shawkat, Akram 
Haurani, Michel Aflak, Salah-ed-
Din Bitar vs. Government 
Government wins 0 
1954  Unspecified Government 0 
1955 Syrian Populist Party Government 1 
1961 Army vs. Government Army 999 
1962 Brig-Gen Nahalawi, Brig-Gen. 





1962, 1963, 1963  Nasserites vs. Government Government 0, 0, 0 
1963 Gen. Atassi; Amin al Hafiz 
Vs. Government 
Gen. Atassi; Amin al Hafiz 
 
0 
1966 Gen. Assad, Col. Suidan 
Vs. Government 
Gen. Assad, Col. Suidan 
 
41 
1966 Col. Selim Hatoum 
     Vs. Government 
Government 41 
1970  Gen. Assad vs. Government Gen. Assad 0 
1982, 1987 Unspecified Government 50, 40 
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 The first coup led by Col. Zaim took place to topple the anti Zionist regime of 
Quawwatli.  Zaim offered a full peace with Israel, but all they got was an armistice agreement.  
Col. Zaim was overthrown by Hinnawi, who was in turn overthrown by Shishakli.  The 
government again offered a non-aggression pact in return for access to Lake Tiberius.  Israel 
refused the offer (Ma’ov, 21).  After that overture, no other Syrian leader would negotiate with 
Israel with such generous terms.  The table above shows when the coups happened.  Except for 
the Zaim coup, all the others do not appear to be timed with Israeli conflicts to contribute to 
them.  There were other factors involved, such as the Ba’ath in charge or union with Egypt.  
When the coups happened they were relatively bloodless.  After Assad took control in 1970, 
Syria achieved political stability (Leverett, 23).  After he died in 2000, the Presidency passed 
peacefully to his son Bashir (Leverett, 67).    
 From the conclusion of the 1948 War, Syria underwent numerous coups.  However, the 
coups did not occur within the time frame that there was war with Israel.  As the figure suggests, 
the coups were not violent enough to keep the country destabilized as what happened in 
Lebanon.  When the coups occurred, they usually happened in the lull of fighting between Israel 
and Syria.  As the evidence suggests, there is no tie between these coups as a result of Israeli 
actions.  They were brought about by internal differences.  Plus they were not violent enough to 
destabilize the government from taking armed action against Israel.  After Assad took over in 
1970, the country enjoyed political stability that continues to this day.  Based on this evidence, 
this hypothesis does not explain why there is a cold peace between Israel and Syria. 
Hypothesis # 3 
 Syria has had much foreign influence during its history as a state.  From Britain, to the 
United States, to the Soviet Union, to Egypt each of these states has had an effect on Syria’s 
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stance towards Israel.  This section will test to see if these relationships explain Syria’s stance 
towards Israel, or if Syria used these relations to achieve their ends.  Did foreigner cause Syria’s 
reaction towards Israel, or was it Syria manipulating the foreign powers to help them achieve 
their goals?  Upon the answering of these question, it will be determined if this hypothesis 
explains the cold peace between Israel and Syria. 
 The United States has had a say in Syrian affairs with the coups of Zaim and Shishakli.  
The United States supported these coups in order to build their oil pipeline through the country.  
Since the United States was pro-Israel, it is only logical that these leaders worked towards 
reconciliation with Israel to make their backers in Washington happy (Ma’ov, 20).  In this 
regard, a foreign backer was instrumental in trying to bring about peace between Israel and 
Syria.  The British brought Hinnawi into power for their pipeline to be built instead.  There is no 
record of Hinnawi seeking peace with Israel since he was in office for such a short period of time 
(Ma’ov, 21).  When the country became united with Egypt, a switch occurred between being 
friendly to being hostile to the state of Israel. 
 Syria joined with Nasser’s Egypt to form the United Arab Republic in 1958 in order to 
become a more formidable force against Israel (Ma’ov, 56).  Egypt used Syria as a base to 
establish a northern front from which Egyptian troops could attack Israel (Herzog, 145).  When 
Egypt began treating Syria as second class, Syria withdrew from the Union.  This ended the 
attempts at a unified Nasser state.  However, Egyptian influence continued.  Both states still 
maintained an alliance to defeat Israel in the 1973 War.  The Soviet Union was also instrumental 
in this period.  They provided $28398 million in arms assistance to help equip Syria’s army to 
make it on par with the Israeli army (www.sipri.org).  The amount was needed to upgrade 
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Syria’s military.  It also accounts for the biggest deal between a foreign state and Syria.  This 
proves that certain outside influences can lead to aggression between two states.   
 There is evidence that outside powers did influence Syria, especially during the Zaim and 
Shishakli reigns.  However; once those men were out of power, Syria aligned themselves with 
foreign powers that would help them defeat Israel.  This explains the aid from Egypt and the 
Soviet Union.  It appears that this hypothesis works in the reverse.  Instead of foreigners 
influencing Syria to make peace with Israel, Syria used foreign aid to help them build a better 
army to take on Israel.  This hypothesis does not explain the cold peace between Israel and Syria.   
Hypothesis # 4 
 There are few states in the region that have been successful in building nuclear reactors.  
Iraq was one example, and Syria is the other.  This has been most troubling to Israel.  They do 
not want to have their enemies to be in possession of such weapons that threaten their security.  
This section will examine Syria’s nuclear program and Israel’s reaction.  The results will help 
explain if this hypothesis of two nuclear powers in the region has brought upon the cold peace. 
 Syria has attempted to build a reactor in their country.  The time is frame dubious, since 
like Israel it is being conducted in secrecy.  The latest intelligence puts the reactor being built in 
the mid 2000s.  Like Israel, they deny that it is a nuclear reactor or is used for nefarious purposes 
(Wright, 1A).  The Syrians have not allowed the I.A.E.A. (International Atomic Energy Agency) 
inspectors to inspect the sites, leading the evidence to mount that they are pursuing nuclear 
technology (Asculai, 14).  The North Koreans have been accused of helping set up the reactor 
(Wright, 1A).  This could be seen as one rogue state helping another (Braun et al, 12).  If Syria 
obtains nuclear weapons, then they no longer have to worry about an attack by nuclear Israel.  
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This is dependent on the argument that deterrence works.  They can use their nuclear warheads 
to accomplish their preliminary mission of wiping out the Jewish state (Ma’oz, 16).   
 Israel launched an air strike into Syria to neutralize this reactor in the fall of 2007 (Times 
On-line, 1).  The air strike was successful and the alleged reactor was destroyed (Hider, 42).  
Israel claimed that the strike was essential in maintaining its security (Bubalo, 33).  If they had 
allowed the reactor to become more mature, it would have been nearly impossible to shut it 
down.  If Syria was allowed to build their reactor, then they would have used it in such a way as 
to destabilize the region even further.  In destroying the reactor, Israel ensured its survival and 
got rid of its enemy possessing nuclear arms. With this stance it is understood that Syria going 
nuclear will not bring nuclear balance to the region; it will only bring further conflict between 
the two countries.  Thus the peace for which Bueno de Mesquita argues for in the literature 
review is mooted (de Mesquita, 288). 
Hypothesis # 5 
 Israel proliferated in 1967.  As the evidence above suggests from 1948 till the 1973 War, 
Syria advocated destroying the Jewish state in replacing it with a Palestinian one.  However, the 
1973 War saw a change.  Syria no longer wanted Israel destroyed; they only wanted their land 
back.  Why this sudden about face?  Could Israel’s nuclear program bring about a change in the 
goals of Syria?  The timing that this happened after Israel proliferated seems to be more than 
coincidence.  Could it be that Israel having nuclear arms has contributed to the cold peace 
between the two countries?  This section will look at the evidence to see if this is the case. 
 The Syrian government told its army that they should not cross into the international 
boundary and invade Israel (O’Ballance, 137).  The reason lies with the answer General Sada 
gave in his interview with Joel Rosenberg.  If Syria invaded Israel proper, then that would be 
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inviting a nuclear retaliation from Israel (Rosenberg, 177).  In fact, speculation was that Defense 
Minister Dayan had ordered Israel’s nukes on standby to be ready to launch into Syria if the 
Syrians invaded Israel (Ma’oz, 130).  This is especially complicated due to the fact that Israel is 
sending settler’s to claim the Golan Heights (Leverett, 47).  This could lead to eventual Israeli 
annexing the area as they did the West Bank.  If this would happen, under this principle, Syria 
could never attack to get the Golan Heights back.  If Syria tried, they could face nuclear 
retaliation.  This fits in the notion that Israel’s usage of nuclear arms has always been top protect 
its existence as a state (Quester, 547). 
 With Syria, like with Egypt and Iraq, it seems that Israel’s nuclear arsenal has contributed 
to the cold peace between the two countries.  Proliferation of Israel seems to have deterred Syria 
from attacking Israel to destroy their state.  The down side, there was still war.  The hypothesis 
provides some support, but does not fully explain the cold peace between Israel and Syria.  The 
problem lies in the fact that Syria is trying to overcome that problem by either proliferating on its 
own or allying itself with a nuclear Iran.  The next section will look at how Israel can use its 
nuclear weapons to bring peace to the Levant. 
Conclusion 
 This case study examined Syria in the hopes to explain the cold peace that has existed 
between the two countries since the 1973 War.  The first hypothesis seems likely since it 
demonstrates that Syria is not powerful enough to take Israel on by itself in another war.  The 
evidence that this is true is given by their attitudes towards Iran.  Syria has been attempting to 
overcome this problem by joining in an alliance with anti-Israeli Iran.  The test of the second 
hypothesis shows there is no correlation between internal instability and the cold peace with 
Israel.  Forcing intervention seems to have worked when the U.S. was backing the governments 
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of Zaim and Shishakli.  However, after those rulers Syria has been pursuing alliances that will 
help it in its goals of defeating Israel.  Syria, allegedly, has been pursuing proliferation believed 
to offset the advantage Israel has in this area.  These tests show that Syria proliferating will not 
bring a cold peace between the two countries.  It will only result in a nuclear war.  Finally, the 
evidence presented about Israel’s nuclear program seems to be the forefront of explaining the 
current cold peace between the two countries.  While not perfect, it explains at least why Syria 
did not invade Israel proper during the 1973 War, and why they will not attack Israel until they 
offset that advantage.  That is why the next section dealing with a nuclear armed Iran aligned 
with Syria and Hezbollah is a threat to the peace in the Levant.    
Summation 
Caveat:  As pointed out earlier in this work, there is evidence against Israeli deterrence.  
Examples cited include the 1973 War which happened after Israel proliferated in 1967, Iraqi 
scud attacks during the Gulf War, and the ongoing conflict in Lebanon.  Common knowledge 
perpetuated by the government of Israel and the western media is that the Arab states’ mission is 
to destroy the Israeli state.  Therefore, deterrence does not work in the face of an enemy who 
wants to see the state of Israel destroyed.  However, this does not damage the argument that 
Israel proliferated for its survival as a state.  As will be shown in the case studies, this view 
articulated to the western audience was true up to a point.  What this paper hopes to accomplish 
via the case studies is to show the Arab point of view to Israel having nuclear weapons.  It will 
be shown that after a point in time, the Arabs no longer wanted the annihilation of the Jewish 
state rather they wanted their territory back.  Looking at their behavior towards Israel from 1948 
till the present will help one understand what made the Arab states cease waging traditional war 
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with Israel, and come to the negotiating table to work out a permanent peace agreement with 
Israel.   
Figure 6 (X shows hypothesis is supported) 
Case Study Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 5 
Iraq   X  X 
Egypt   X  X 
Jordan X     
Lebanon  X    
Syria X  X  X 
 
 The Iraqi case study has shown that the first hypothesis does not apply.  Iraq was 
continually in conflict with Israel up to the first Gulf War.  The evidence shows that Iraq did not 
believe itself to be subservient to Israel militarily.  The table in the Iraqi case study proves that 
when conflict happened in the country, it was not during the years it was openly fighting with 
Israel.  The results from foreign intervention mainly the U.S. occupation, explains why there has 
not been open conflict between Iraq and Israel.  Iraq did try to build a nuclear reactor, but instead 
of bringing peace with Israel it just brought more conflict.  Sada’s comments show how Israel’s 
nuclear capabilities eased escalation between the two countries; however, it did not bring peace 
between the two countries. 
 The tests for the first hypothesis in Egypt turned out to be false.  The 1973 War proved 
that Egypt was able to hold their own against Israel, but instead they sued for peace.  The results 
from coups launched in Egypt shows that there were many in Egypt’s modern history.  However, 
these coups did not happen during conflicts with Israel.  Therefore, they did not cause enough 
instability in that country for them to be unable to fight Israel.  U.S. foreign aid turned out to be a 
major contributing factor to keep Egypt friendly towards Israel.  No war means Egypt gets a lot 
of money from the U.S.  Egypt did not proliferate, so the fourth hypothesis was inconclusive.  
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The tests show that Israel proliferating had an impact on Egypt suing for a peace treaty with 
Israel.  They were afraid that another war could provoke a nuclear response.  
 The tests for Jordan show that they were interested in acquiring more land.  When they 
found out that America would not let Israel lose any more territory, they decided it was best to 
sign a peace treaty with Israel than to continue on with costly wars.  Jordan has had remarkable 
political stability; the country is still under the rule of the Hashemite family since they became an 
independent state.  Jordan has used foreign intervention to shore up its power base and keep its 
economy in good shape.  Jordan has not tried to proliferate, so the fourth hypothesis is 
inconclusive.  The fifth hypothesis can be assumed, but needs more evidence to know if it played 
a large part or not.  
 The case with Lebanon is more direct.  They fought with Israel in 1948.  Shortly 
thereafter they descended into civil war that has lasted until today.  This has provided enormous 
amounts of instability in Lebanon.  This explains why there has been peace between Israel and 
Lebanon.  The other hypotheses do not have this level of support to make them valid in this case 
study.  The problem lies in the non state actors (such as Hezbollah) who operate out of Lebanon 
to attack Israel.  
 Syria has many hypotheses explaining their current cold peace with Israel.  Since the 
other members of the old Arab alliance have either made peace with Israel, are under occupation, 
or going through a massive civil war; that has left Syria powerless to fight Israel by themselves.  
The table has proven that coups in Syria, while many were not successful and did not occur 
during conflict with Israel.  Syria has used foreign aid to help them prepare for future conflicts 
with Israel.  As with Iraq, Syria proliferating brought conflict not peace with Israel.  Israel’s 
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nuclear capabilities limited Syrian objectives during the 1973 War, but alone they did not bring 
the peace between the two countries.         
 The table provides interesting insight.  The table and the case studies show that no one 
hypothesis works the best to explain the current cold peace in the Levant.  Much of the 
hypotheses seem to compliment one another to explain the current cold peace.  While nuclear 
weapons did not bring peace, it was shown that they limited the goals of the Arab states in the 
1973 War.  They also have contributed to the peace process between Israel and Egypt. 
V. The Iranian Threat 
 Iran begins a new section in this paper.  The five alternative hypotheses presented above 
cannot be tested due to the fact that Iran and Israel have not engaged in open warfare during the 
modern era.  However, Iran seeking to become a nuclear power poses a huge threat to not just 
Israel, but to the Western World.  This section will examine how Iran came to hate Israel, how 
they are embarking on building their nuclear arsenal, the dangers of their religious belief system, 
and finally how recent protests can lead to a diversionary nuclear war against Israel.  Iran ties 
into the section in the literature review that deals with the danger of rogue states and terrorists.  
Iran fits the rogue state category, and from previous sections it is know that Iran supports 
terrorists.  From that evidence, it goes to refute the argument made in the first section of nuclear 
proliferation that two nuclear powers in the region will bring peace.  A nuclear Iran can only lead 
to further conflict in the Levant.  Since there has not been a war between Israel and Iran, due to 
the fact that it was only recently Iran took a hostile turn towards Israel (1979 Islamic 
Revolution), the five hypotheses can not be tested in the same manner as the case studies.  
However, they are present in this section.     
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Friends Now Enemies 
 Iran and Israel did not historically demonstrate the animosity between each other that is 
exhibited today.  The Shah of Iran had pursued a very close relationship with Israel.  The Shah 
saw Israel as an ally that would grant him greater access to Washington.  There was also the need 
for Israeli expertise in agriculture and weaponry.  From Iran, Israel received access to the rest of 
the third world with Iran acting as a mediator (Abadi, 35).  Iran and Israel also cooperated as 
they both sent aid to the imam of Yemen fighting Nasser to keep his throne (217).  While there 
was tacit working together at the elite level, the clerics opposed Israel on religious grounds.  
They were sympathetic to the cause of their fellow Muslims (Abadi, 37). 
 This group of politicians was the ones who seized power during the Iranian Revolution of 
1979.  Khomeini blamed Israel for creating economic disaster in his country.  He even accused 
Israel of helping the Shah ruthlessly suppressing the Revolution (Abadi, 47).  Israel became the 
object of hatred for the Iranian people.  Israel was decried as the little Satan.  Their flags were 
burned in effigy and trampled under the boots of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Arjomand, 
157).  The Iranian President, Ahmadinejad, has publicly called for Israel to be wiped off the face 
of the map (Rosenberg, 109).  Some would argue that this is meant to keep the populace content 
with their government.  The problem is these statements were mad before there was any problem 
with the populace being content with the regime.  This rhetoric is meant to be provocative as will 
be demonstrated in the following sections.  Clearly this sentiment is making a nervous Israel 
even more paranoid. 
 History is very important to this section.  It shows how there were good feelings between 
the two regimes.  It explains why the current animosity exists, and why it is so difficult to 
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resolve.  It explains the current animosities between the leaders of the two countries.  This leads 
into the next section examining why a nuclear Iran is a threat to the stability of the Levant.   
Going Nuclear 
 Iran is interested in becoming a dominant player in the Levant.  To obtain this end, they 
feel that they need to become nuclear to secure this place (Karpin, 346).  Iran however, insists 
that their program is for peaceful purposes.  They argue it will help bolster jobs and reduce their 
unemployment rate.  They also argue that it will allow them to pursue another cleaner form of 
electricity (Melman et al, 63).  The Ayatollah Khamenei has issued a fatwah that states Iran is 
forbidden to make nuclear bombs, meaning that the program will be used for civilian purposes 
(Arjomand, 185).  Regarding the fatwah issued by the Ayatollah Khamenei, he has made 
statements that contradict this statement.  While president, he called for the nuclear program to 
be used as weapons to make Iran a super power (Rosenberg, 156).  There is significant evidence 
that goes against this logic and suggests a more nefarious purpose.  Iran has the second largest 
reserves of natural gas on the planet.  They rank among the top oil producers as well (Melman et 
al, 61).  In light of this evidence, there is no economic incentive for Iran to change its energy 
policy while they are leading the world in reserves. Israel believes that Iran going nuclear will 
fulfill their threats to wipe Israel off of the map.  Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu has argued 
for a pre-emptive strike to stop Iran from proliferating (Rosenberg, 327).  
 The answer to why Iran has proliferated lies in Israel itself.  The Iranian government sees 
the United States and Israel as their principle adversaries.  It is no wonder that since these are 
nuclear states, if Iran wants to balance them they must become nuclear as well.  This is the claim 
that Arjomand makes in his book (Arjomand, 197).  These arguments tend to support Bueno de 
Mesquita and his colleagues, who argue that two states with nuclear bombs will bring peace via 
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nuclear assured destruction.  This would make sure both sides would sit down and resolve their 
differences through dialogue (Beardsley et al, 289).  The ideology of the Iranian leadership 
inhibits this idealism from taking hold in Iran.  The tests for hypothesis number fours shows that 
any state proliferating in the Levant will only bring conflict, not peace, to the region. 
Apocalyptic Government 
 The experts in the section dealing with the evils of nuclear proliferation were right when 
it comes to Iran.  Their culture is different from the ones shared by the West and Israel.  They do 
not lead themselves to see nuclear war as a deterrent, but as a means to achieve their empire 
(Sagan, 70).  They would threaten Israel with nuclear war to make concessions that could lead to 
them sacrificing their position as a state (Joffe, 38).  This is following the policy of 
brinkmanship.  The literature review discussed why this is dangerous to the peace in the Levant.  
This again refutes the argument that two nuclear states following a policy of deterrence will 
bring peace to the Levant.  Why Iran will not be a deterrent is based on the views of their leaders. 
 First to be examined is the Ayatollah Khamenei.  He is the successor to the Ayatollah 
Khomeini who led the Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Arjomand, 7).  He is not a person friendly to 
the interests of the Israelis.  He has stated that the Israelis are barbaric wolves, and that Iran has 
been beating Israel and her allies for the past 25 years.  He has called for Israel to be erased off 
the map, as he wants to set up an Islamic caliphate, and he is pushing for Iran’s nuclear program 
to go on-line soon (Rosenberg, 156).  He is a threat.  He controls the government of Iran as well 
as its military forces (Arjomand, 12).  If he wants conflict, all he has to do is give the order.  This 
shows how the leaders of Iran have used the rhetoric in the previous section to gain legitimacy 
for their program.  However, the views of the current Ayatollah and President Ahmadinejad 
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(discussed below) gives heavy hint that they want to use their nuclear program for offensive 
purposes.   
 The second most dangerous person in Iran is their President Ahmadinejad.  He believes 
he was chosen by the hidden imam to usher in his coming.  He believes the only way for that to 
happen is to unleash world chaos (Melman et al, 42).  What better way for this to occur then to 
accelerate and complete Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  He can then provoke an attack that 
would trigger a nuclear war by continuing to antagonize Israel (Rosenberg, 109).  To have this 
ideologue in power means that deterrence will not work.  Prime Minter Netanyahu holds this 
view.  He believes that one can not negotiate with this kind of ideologue.  The only way to stop 
them is to take military action (Rosenberg, 327).  This is especially true when a leader wants to 
bring nuclear war to bring in their messiah (Harkavy, 136). 
 The fact that Iran is under the control of two men that do not care for Israel is very 
troubling.  The fact that they have both called for Israel’s destruction is also troubling.  The 
worst part is that they are willing to use nuclear arms not for peace but to bring war.  The views 
of these leaders show why Iran is a rogue state.  It further shows why they will not follow the 
policy of deterrence.  The leaders do not want peace like Sadat and King Hussein, they want war.  
The worst is yet to come.  Events in Iran have been unfolding that has challenged this power 
structure.  This change could lead to conflict breaking out. 
The People 
 The past summer saw the Presidential race in Iran.  It involved Ahmadinejad and 
Mousavi.  Mousavi was seen as the reformer who wanted to improve relations with the United 
States.  One way to achieve this was calming down the rhetoric against Israel.  Ahmadinejad won 
the election, but Mousavi cried foul.  This led to street protests breaking out across the country 
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(Christian Science Monitor, 1).  The protests, that continue sporadically to this day, are seen 
bringing in another Revolution that will topple the regime of Khamenei.  This is due to the fact 
that his regime is acting like the shah’s regime, and not letting democracy take hold in the 
country (Dixon, 5).  This can lead to the instability that hypothesis two was attempting to explain 
in the case studies.  Thee protests have the potential to bring in regime change, or it can lead to 
disastrous results.  The worst case scenario is discussed below. 
 This has put the regime in a predicament from which it is difficult to disengage.  They 
have tried to arrest the protestors, but that does not seem to be making any headway (Dixon, 5).  
This might cause Iran to pursue a diversionary tactic (Dixon, 5).  As the evidence shows above, 
the people are united in the cause of being anti Israeli.  What better way to regain control of the 
country than by starting a conflict with Israel.  That would lead to a rallying around the flag 
effect that would solidify the Iranian government (Arjomand, 215).  This would also meet the 
goals of President Ahmadinejad and his apocalyptic sect (Melman et al, 42).  The government 
stays in the good graces of their people, and they achieve their goal of using a nuclear war to 
usher in their messiah  
 The recent events of the people protesting for democracy in Iran cannot be viewed as a 
negative consequence between the relations of Israel and Iran.  It is hoped they will get what they 
want by ushering in a moderate government, and bring Iran back to the international community.  
The moderate government could help bring peace between Iran and Israel.  There is a danger to 
these protests.  The Iranian government could use a war with Israel to regain control.  Looking at 





 Iran has gone though changes in its stance with Israel.  They tacitly supported Israel 
under the Shah.  Such support irked the fundamentalist clerics, and when they came to power 
relations between the two countries deteriorated.  Now Iran is pursuing its own nuclear arms 
program.  This is dangerous in the light of the ideology of the Iranian regime.  Also recent events 
that have threatened the regime could bring conflict between the two countries sooner than 
anticipated.  The next section will shed light on how Israel can use its nuclear arms to bring 
peace with Iran.  
VI. Bringing Nuclear Peace to the Levant 
 The case studies have shown that Israel’s nuclear program has played a significant 
contributing factor in bringing peace between their neighbors.  The problem is that this did not 
bring total peace.  In the case of Egypt and Syria, it changed their goal from attacking to destroy 
Israel to attacking to regain their territory.  In the case of Iraq, it led to the scud missile attacks 
during the first Gulf War not to the chemical warfare that Saddam had originally advocated for.   
 This paper realizes that Israel’s nuclear weapons program did not bring peace to the 
Levant.  It was only a contributing factor in the cold peace with Syria, and the actual peace with 
Egypt.  There is no cause to lose hope that Israel’s nuclear program can not be used to bring 
peace to the Levant.  This section will explore how Israel can make use of its nuclear 
ambivalence to make their program public.  Israel can employ a policy of brinkmanship to 
achieve peace.  It is a risky policy, but this paper will show it is the best policy for bringing Iran 
and Syria into peace with Israel.  
Iran becoming nuclear is also problematic due to the regime’s ideology and stance 
towards Israel.  This section will explain why this has resulted, and how to make nuclear 
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deterrence bring peace to the Levant.  This section will especially focus on the threat of Iran, 
since it is viewed as the most serious threat to Israel.  It is hoped that the lessons taken from Iran 
can be applied to Syria and Lebanon dominated Lebanon to bring all the countries in the Levant 
into a peace agreement with Israel.  
Problem 
The main reason why deterrence has not worked in the way it was hoped is due in large 
part to Israel’s nuclear policy.  Israel has also pursued a policy of secrecy in regards to their 
nuclear program (Levite, 69).  This has created confusion in the ranks of the enemy.  They do not 
know if Israel has the weapons or not (Maoz, 57).  This means that they do not know if they 
strike Israel that Israel will retaliate with nuclear arms (Rosen, 1372).  This has led to a lack of 
credibility.  This could be the reason why the Arab states still attacked Israel after they 
proliferated in 1967.  They did not know for sure that Israel had the bomb.  Not knowing for sure 
allowed them to risk a war to get their territories back (Schelling, 152).  This could be resolved if 
the Israeli government makes its nuclear program public. If the announcement was to occur, then 
there would be no doubt if Israel possessed nuclear arms or not.  This would also help clarify if 
Israel having nuclear weapons will bring peace to the Levant.  
 In regard to the looming threat from the Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran raised in 
the previous sections, Israel is in the unique position of making nuclear deterrence bring them 
peace.  In addition to making their program public, they must show that their Jericho missiles are 
effective delivery systems of a nuclear warhead (Karpin, 127).  This helps eliminate the 
uncertainty, because it shows that Israel has the capability to take out the enemies if they so 
desired.  Another major benefit is that Israel is not party to the non proliferation treaty, meaning 
they can continue to proliferate (Karsh, 120).  Israel is also not a party to the nuclear test ban 
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treaty.  This means that they can still conduct tests of their nuclear arms (Schelling, 153).  Not 
being a party to these two agreements is important for the policy recommendation that will 
follow in the next paragraph. 
Policy Recommendation 
 The paper so far has covered the policy of deterrence as a means of bringing peace to the 
Levant.  As the Iraq and Syrian case study demonstrated that a bipolar nuclear situation in the 
Levant will not bring peace, it will only bring conflict.  Therein lays the problem.  If nuclear 
weapons via deterrence have not brought peace to the Levant, then why should the region have a 
nuclear state?  This section will deal with that problem. 
 The case studies have shown that the policy of nuclear deterrence has not brought peace 
to the Levant.  This section of the analysis will explore the other nuclear policy outlined in this 
paper:  the policy of nuclear brinkmanship.  Deterrence will not stop Iran.  The actions made by 
their current President ensure this.  Ahmadinejad has stated that he will welcome war with Israel 
in order to usher in his messiah (Melman et al, 53).  While the government of Iran is apocalyptic, 
the people of Iran are not.  As shown in the previous section, they are tired of this current regime 
(Christian Science Monitor, 1).  It is with the people that the diversionary tactic rests.  If Israel 
threatens them with nuclear war, it is hoped that it will cause the people to make a change of 
government in order to save their lives.  This is what the policy of brinkmanship hopes to 
accomplish (Powell, 101).          
It is felt that the main reason why Israel has not admitted it nuclear program is due to the 
fact that they are afraid that doing so will invite international pressure for them to give them up 
(Maoz, 46).  Israel does not want that kind of attention in this current political environment.  
They need world opinion to be on their side (Maoz, 76).  The belief of this paper is that while 
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condemnation will appear, nothing will come of it.  A good example is the response to Israel 
bombing the Iraqi and Syrian reactors (Karsh, 94).   
The author proposes that both of these facts about Israel not being party to either the test 
ban treaty or non proliferation treaty should be used to make peace between Israel and its 
enemies.  Israel will announce on world wide media that they have nuclear weapons.  This would 
eliminate the uncertainty that has plagued the Muslim governments before (Schelling, 152).  This 
addresses why Israel’s nuclear program was not the preeminent factor in bringing peace between 
Israel and the countries examined in the case studies.    Israel will then need to show that their 
missiles can effectively deliver a nuclear payload to any region in the Levant (Karpin, 127).  
They will then invite the major news media of the Levant to watch a demonstration of their 
nuclear capabilities by detonating a nuclear bomb.  Again this would eliminate the uncertainty 
that their weapons are not effective.  They should end by sending a diplomatic message to the 
governments of Lebanon (if the Hezbollah take control), Syria, and Iran that Israel has entered 
their countries as nuclear targets.  In the case of Iran, this message is to its citizens since their 
government is so ideological.  The plan is if the citizens believe that if they keep on provoking 
Israel, then they might be the target of a nuclear attack.  This should allow significant pressure to 
be applied to the Iranian government to deter them from making such a decision (Karpin, 355).  
They will know if they go to war with Israel, they will be annihilated.  This will allow them to 
push their government to not attack Israel.  They might then demand that each state disarm their 
nuclear programs, and make peace with the Israeli state (Bell, 384). 
Summary 
 This paper has shown that Israel’s nuclear deterrence has not been as successful as it was 
hoped.  There are still threats from Syria and Iran.  The evidence show this is largely due to the 
 79 
uncertainty that Israel even possesses nuclear weapon.  Israel has not taken any steps to say one 
way or another if they have nuclear weapon.  They think it helps them, but as the evidence shows 
while partly true, they can use their program to achieve so much more.  This section dealt with 
how Israel can use nuclear deterrence to squelch this threat.  By demonstrating that they do have 
nuclear weapons, that they work well and that they can deliver them, means that by using 
offensive tactics Israel can eliminate these threats to their national security.  If this policy is 
implemented then peace in the Levant will be achieved via nuclear arms.  
VII. Conclusion 
 The goal of this paper was to examine if Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons had 
brought peace to the Levant.  The catalyst was that after the 1973 War, no more war emerged 
between Israel and their Arab neighbors.  This was also around the time Israel proliferated.  This 
seemed to be too much of a coincidence, so further examination was warranted.  The paper was 
broken into a literature review, case study, Iranian threat, and policy recommendation to address 
the hypothesis. 
 The literature review examined the experts who were either in favor of or who opposed 
nuclear proliferation.  Evidence was gathered to understand why Israel proliferated in order to 
understand what they hoped to accomplish by proliferating.  The evidence showed that Israel 
proliferated for economic reasons as well as security reasons.  They are both intertwined in 
understanding their case.  The evidence also suggests that there is no need to worry about Israeli 
proliferation; they only use it to protect their survival as a state.  Also examined was the bad side 
of proliferation.  This was needed to understand why the other states proliferating would bring 
instability rather than peace to the Levant. 
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 The next section looked at each of the five states that fought against Israel from the time 
frame 1948 till the present day.  The five countries were Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.  
Five alternative hypotheses were proposed to explain the cold peace between the countries.  The 
five were:  the state found out they could not beat Israel, there was internal stability that ruled out 
another war, foreign aid an intervention (especially U.S.) brought the peace, and the other states 
themselves proliferated and that ceased further aggression from Israel.  The results from Iraq 
suggested that all the hypothesis (except Iraq proliferating) were correct in understanding the 
cold peace between Israel and Iraq.  The Egyptian case study yielded that foreign aid and Israel’s 
nuclear arsenal are the reasons for the Egyptian-Israeli peace.  Jordan’s results are that the 
government manipulated foreign aid to meet their desire of peace with Israel.  In Lebanon’s case 
internal stability has meant they can not conduct another conflict against Israel.  Again with 
Syria all hypotheses seem to be present, but not all of them have contributed to the peace 
between Israel and Syria.  However; while nuclear deterrence is a contributing factor, there is 
still danger of another war with Syria. 
 The paper went on to examine Iran.  How Iran and Israel had a tacit friendship under the 
Shah, but how relations soured after the rise of the Islamic Republic.  The leaders of Iran were 
scrutinized to see what their motivations were for becoming a nuclear power, and the results 
were frightening.  The recent democratic protests, while a good thing, can push Iran into war 
with Israel.  This set up the section on how Israel can use its nuclear arsenal to make peace in the 
Levant. 
 The problem with Israel’s nuclear program is that it is secret.  The Arab government did 
not know if Israel had the bomb or not.  This has led to complications.  This explains why there 
was still conflict after Israel proliferated.  The paper suggested how that problem could be 
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resolved.  The paper then suggests how Israel can use threat of nuclear war to deter the 
governments, and populations of Iran and Syria from wanting war with Israel.  It is 
acknowledged that there are negative consequences to this policy; especially if Israel goes public 
then the world will pressure them to give up their arsenal.  However, that happening is unlikely 
as explained earlier in this paper.  Israel can use this policy to allow their nuclear arms to bring 
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